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Executive summary
A large body of research exists in relation to youth crime. However, comparatively 
little is known in relation to the contexts of children who engage in serious 
offending behaviour and participate in criminal networks. Using a case study 
design, this study first identified and then examined the behaviour of a criminal 
network operating in a Garda Sub-District in Ireland in 2010–2011. 
For the purposes of the study, the Garda Sub-District, which is located outside of 
Dublin, has been given the pseudonym Greentown.
In order to facilitate this examination, Garda analysts constructed a network map for 
the study using incident data to position 31 individuals aged 11–36 years who had 
been involved in either burglary or drugs for sale and supply in Greentown in 2010–
2011. Importantly, the map indicated relationships where two or more individuals 
were involved in the same offence. The map was used as the key reference tool to 
interview Greentown Gardaí about the activities and contexts of the individuals 
identified.
The Twinsight method
A method called Twinsight was designed to facilitate access to actual case-related 
data. This involved the use of two near-identical versions of the network map during 
the interviews with Gardaí. In the researcher’s version, the name of each individual 
was replaced with a unique identifying code, e.g. A1, B2, and D1. In the version 
used by Garda interviewees, the names of the individuals appeared alongside 
their identifying code. This permitted the researcher and the Garda respondents 
to talk about the same individuals, with their identities known only to the Garda. 
Twinsight enabled the production of an authentic narrative around key events, while 
protecting the identities of the individuals at all times. 
Key findings
It was found that the criminal network which existed in Greentown in 2010–2011 
was hierarchical in nature and was governed by a family and kinship-based ‘core’. 
The hierarchical structure was supported by a deeply embedded sympathetic 
culture in the area, as well as powerful ongoing processes – in particular, patronage-
based relationships which shared the rewards of crime among associates, but also 
generated onerous debt obligations. 
It was also found that the power and influence of the network is most influenced by 
the intensity of the relationships between individual members of the network and 
the network patrons, but geographical proximity between them also plays a role.
The overall key finding of the study was that criminal networks play a significant 
role in encouraging and compelling children to engage in criminal behaviour.
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The study identified potential applications for the methods used in the project to 
progress further research on serious youth crime, and outlined some implications for 
youth crime-related policy.
Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature, outlining the strengths and 
limitations of existing mainstream scientific knowledge on youth crime, followed 
by a more specific review of the literature relating to networks and crime. Chapter 2 
outlines the overall methodological strategy and describes how a case study method 
was operationalised. Chapter 3 presents the research findings. Chapter 4 assesses 
the study’s contribution to the existing body of knowledge, and considers the study’s 
implications for wider policy and practical application.
3
Introduction
Greentown is a fictitious name for an actual Garda Sub-District1 in Ireland. The 
focus of this study is on a persistent offender population in Greentown in the period 
2010–2011. 
The study found compelling evidence to substantiate the existence of a criminal 
network involving adults and children in Greentown, and identified the role of this 
network in sustaining high levels of serious criminal activity. 
Having established the existence of a criminal network, the study attempted to 
answer three further questions:
1. How and why did children initially engage with the Greentown network, 
and what factors influenced and sustained their engagement?
2. How was offending behaviour specifically supported by the network? 
3. How easy or difficult was it for a child involved in a network to determine 
and act upon their own choices (i.e. exercise free will), including the option 
of leaving the network? 
Using a case study design, the study utilised data from three sources: 
• Official statistical crime records (PULSE)• A statistically constructed criminal network map indicating offending 
relationships between individual actors (2010–2011) in Greentown 
• Testimony from individual frontline members of An Garda Síochána based  
in Greentown
These data were processed and analysed using a transparent stepwise method 
informed by grounded theory, and emergent themes are presented as findings.  
The final section considers the policy implications of the findings. 
1 ‘For policing purposes the country is divided into six regions. These are divided into Divisions, Districts and, 
finally, Sub-Districts. Each Sub-District is normally the responsibility of a Sergeant and usually has only one 
station, the strength of which may vary from 3 to 100 Gardaí...’ (An Garda Síochána website, accessed  
13 September 2016,  http://www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=21&Lang=1)
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Scientific evidence relating to youth crime, largely derived from longitudinal and other 
outcome studies, increasingly ‘encourages a more optimistic view about the prediction, 
explanation and prevention of offending’ (Farrington and Welsh, 2008, p. 18), 
identifying early on which children are more likely to turn delinquent and identifying 
what can be done to best reduce these odds (Farrington and Welsh, 2008, pp. 158–161).
The theoretical framework developed on foot of this scientific endeavour has 
been referred to (perhaps pointedly) as the risk and protection factor paradigm 
(O’Mahony, 2009; Case, 2007). For ease, this body of evidence is referred to as ‘risk 
science’ in this study. At its simplest level, risk science is concerned with identifying 
delinquency probabilities or risks related to children (Hawkins et al, 2008, p. 20) and 
offsetting these risks with evidence-based programmes designed to prevent and 
intervene (Greenwood, 2008, p. 188). 
Analogies with public health are often associated with risk science (Dahlberg, 1998). 
For example, in the same way that body weight, alcohol and tobacco intake and 
exercise have associations with heart disease, stroke and cancer – impulsiveness, 
ineffective parenting and school dropout have been shown to have associations with 
the onset of youth crime (Hawkins et al, 2008). 
Risk science has asserted a ‘hierarchy of evidence’, with scientific knowledge derived 
from randomised control trials (RCTs) occupying pole position. Increasingly, 
international expert communities (Goldson and Muncie, 2006, p. 98) broker this 
knowledge, meaning that not only is plain-speak advice now available about which 
programmes work and which do not, but ‘finding them has never been easier’ 
(Wiederstein, 2013, p. 13).
Off-the-peg programmes offer 
policy-friendly ‘bright-line’ 
benchmarks (Noonan et al, 2009, 
p. 13) by which to gauge the 
performance of any particular 
programme intervention. 
Programmes focusing on the 
early years, the High/Scope Perry 
Preschool Programme (Nores 
et al, 2005), for example, have 
demonstrated how improving the 
cognitive functioning, social and 
problem-solving skills for young 
children builds resilience and positively affects trajectories far down the line, 
yielding reduced incidence of adult criminality in particular. 
The performance of such programmes is, it is argued, policy-transferable and can be 
used to underpin the investment of government funds in prevention and treatment 
choices in multiple jurisdictions (Farrington and Welsh, 2008, pp. 159–161). The 
attraction of such a framework to policy-makers is understandable. Straightforward 
logic about how risks can be counterbalanced by protections informs a dominant 
At its simplest level, risk science 
is concerned with identifying 
delinquency probabilities or risks 
related to children (Hawkins et al, 
2008, p. 20) and offsetting these risks 
with evidence-based programmes 
designed to prevent and intervene 
(Greenwood, 2008, p. 188).
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youth-crime discourse which argues that youth offending can be reduced by 
effective and early intervention. 
Significant evidence also indicates that, in any event, the majority of children grow 
out of crime by the time they reach their late teens or early twenties (Loeber and 
Farrington, 2012, pp. 5–6). Increasing confidence about what has been called the age/
crime curve (offending onset, peak and natural ‘drop-off’) (Loeber and Farrington, 
2012, pp. 5–6), combined with an evidenced-based ‘bang-for-buck’ approach to social 
investments, has led to increased optimism about designing out youth crime. In 
addition, such prevention discourse, with its reassuring and familiar public health 
approach and its positive, benefit-related language, avoids more negative ‘dark 
rhetoric about crime’ (Sparrow, 2008, pp. 38–39). 
Explanations or explorations of serious and persistent criminal behaviour by 
children have received far less scholarly attention, certainly in Ireland. Mostly, Irish 
research relating to youth crime has gravitated more towards commentary on how 
children fare in the youth justice system; for example, examinations of children’s 
rights (Kilkelly, 2008), system responses and young peoples’ experiences of the 
system (O’Donnell and O’Sullivan, 2003; Seymour and Butler, 2008), relationships 
with An Garda Síochána (Feeney, 2009), and critiques of the risk science approach 
adopted by youth justice systems (O’Mahony, 2009). 
Nevertheless, key insights into youth criminal behaviour have been generated, 
particularly in a small number of ethnographic studies in Limerick and Dublin. 
Hourigan (2011) shines a light on children being subject to and participants in 
tyrannical regimes operating in ‘closed’ estates in Limerick, directed and sustained 
by criminal gangs. Ilan’s account of ‘The Crew’ and ‘The Team’ in north inner-city 
Dublin points to the hostility of community towards overt youthful crime (The Crew), 
while, at the same time, harbouring curious ambiguity towards the more serious 
crime committed by the older offenders. This group (The Team) ‘form part of the 
street’s dominant kin culture, have close relatives in leadership positions and are 
viewed as integral to the community’ (Ilan, 2011, p. 1143). 
Risk science: limitations
Despite the apparent surfeit of evidence, there is significant criticism of risk science 
dominance. Criticism focuses on its universality and predictive claims (O’Mahony, 
2009, pp. 106–107) highlighting the importance of place and context; meaning that 
evidence is always ‘provisional and conditional’ (Pawson, 2002, p. 214). 
In this vein, Goldson and Hughes (2010, pp. 217–218) argue that generalist scientific 
claims are incapable of negotiating uneven youth crime landscapes within 
jurisdictions, while Pawson and Tilley assert, at a further micro level, that even 
‘individual estates can have their own criminal careers’ (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 97). 
If local idiosyncrasy counts as much in terms of influence as macro factors established 
by the scientific evidence to increase (or decrease) ‘risk’, this means that interventions 
have contingent or potential as opposed to assured efficacy (Pawson, 2006, p. 178).
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Further criticism of risk science relates to its inability to account for the smaller 
numbers of children who persist in their offending behaviour. Less is known about 
these children, unlike the large majority of children who appear to desist from 
offending over time. Indeed, it is argued that such populations of offenders may 
share more similarities with each other than they do with a general, lower-risk youth 
population (Brame et al, 2010, p. 345). Closer to home, juvenile repeat or persistent 
offenders in Ireland appear to be involved disproportionately in certain types of 
acquisitive crime (e.g. burglary and robbery) as opposed to more hedonistic crime 
(e.g. public order, criminal damage) 
found in the general youth-offending 
population (Redmond, 2011). 
It is therefore legitimate to consider 
whether mainstream risk science 
is sufficiently nuanced to offer 
compelling insights in the area of 
more persistent youth crime. 
‘Network’ as a useful conceptual tool for understanding complexity
It has been argued that generic definitions of network are elusive (Nassimbeni, 1998, 
p. 538) and their configurations and effects are tempered significantly by context 
(Pilbeam et al, 2012, p. 359). However, some understanding of the utility of network 
as a conceptual reference point is critical to making sense of the contribution of 
the Greentown study to what is known about youth offending. This requires some 
discussion regarding how network analysis can complement or, perhaps, trump 
other means of analysis and how, in particular, it can assist in understanding the 
types of criminal behaviour under review in this study. 
It is argued here that network possesses many inherent properties that are crucial 
to understanding context and phenomena involving social groups interacting 
(for whatever reason) towards common outcomes. This discussion of network is 
restricted to three functional qualities, as follows: 
• The first perceives the network as a ‘computational entity’ (Hodgson, 2006, 
p. 16); a tool permitting holistic analysis of a phenomenon and context in its 
natural size and state (Sparrow, 2008, pp. 85–86). 
• The second considers network as an efficient and rational response to 
managing uncertainty in terms of environments and behaviour; maximising 
enterprise while harnessing the efforts of interdependent actors towards a 
particular goal, by ‘the formation of co-operative stable links’ (Nassimbeni, 
1998, p. 542). 
• The third relates to the institutional effects of network. This perspective is 
important in understanding what drives and influences individuals and 
clustered groups towards particular behaviours and directions (including 
youth offending), and how networks are nourished and sustained over time.
Indeed, it is argued that such 
populations of offenders may 
share more similarities with each 
other than they do with a general, 
lower-risk youth population.
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Network: as a holistic tool for analysis 
One of the key challenges facing policy-makers is simply determining the natural 
size and state of a particular problem. Adjusting the policy focus too tightly can result 
in a blinkered, narrow perspective, basing assumptions on too limited a frame of 
analysis. However, if the policy focus is too large, it can become blurred, profiles can 
be flattened and generally lacking in the necessary nuance to observe a problem’s key 
individual features, which is crucial if such analysis is to have any operational benefit 
for policy. Here, network analysis offers a means for taking in the whole while also 
examining the activities of individual actors within a particular context. 
A practical example of network analysis utility is Johnson’s examination of the 
cholera outbreak in the ‘Golden Mile’ in London in the 1850s (Johnson, 2008). 
Johnson describes how Whitehead and Snow’s mapping of contaminated water 
pumps across the Golden Mile neighbourhood demonstrated clear associations 
between certain connected pumps and locations of cholera infection, contradicting 
the received medical consensus that a miasma or ‘cloud’ of infection was causing 
and sustaining the cholera outbreak. The results of their study ensured, ultimately, 
that remedial efforts shifted from the relentless (and pointless) cleaning of soiled 
bed linen in individual households (ordered by medical professionals to reduce 
the effects of the supposed infectious cloud) to a focus on the more effective fixing 
of contaminated water pumps in order to ensure better water quality. While this 
public health example is purely illustrative, it demonstrates the practical utility of 
network analysis in terms of disclosing hidden relationships that may otherwise go 
unnoticed and which may counter general intuition. 
The ability to observe multiple individuals and transactions collectively as one 
phenomenon to make sense of the whole, and to simultaneously zoom in to observe 
the activities of individual units and smaller clusters, has been critical in meeting 
the demands of this study.
Network: as a rational response to managing uncertainty 
At its simplest level, the network can be seen as an entirely rational response 
to managing the effects of external and internal uncertainty. ‘Since complex 
relationships inevitably mean unfinished and incomplete contracts, shared value 
systems reduce coordination costs 
by specifying tacit rules of behaviour 
that are widely shared…’ (Pilbeam 
et al, 2012, p. 370). Networks offer 
groups of independent but, crucially, 
interdependent individuals willing 
to transcend immediate self-interest, 
the opportunity to pursue a greater 
good (which may of course also be 
analogous to each individual’s own 
interest).
The ability to observe multiple 
individuals and transactions 
collectively as one phenomenon 
to make sense of the whole, and to 
simultaneously zoom in to observe 
the activities of individual units and 
smaller clusters, has been critical in 
meeting the demands of this study. 
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Institutional effects of network and enhancement effect on youth offending
It is the capacity of networks to encourage and direct behaviour that is of particular 
interest to this study. If, generically, networks encourage ‘shared patterns of thought’ 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 7) in participants, evidence of the existence of network opens a 
logical line of enquiry relating to establishing whether there is any corresponding 
evidence of institutional effect on behaviour. In the case of this study, if there 
is evidence of an institutional effect by a criminal network on children who are 
involved, it questions to what degree a child can exercise the free choice – an 
important normative assumption in criminal justice systems – to not engage or to 
withdraw (Densley, 2012, p. 316).
With specific reference to children (or youth), a limited body of literature identifies 
particular properties associated with criminal networks. One such conception 
is criminal network as local enterprise, a corporate body offering local youth 
employment, sense of meaning, identity and self-worth; ‘garnering respect’ among 
other attractions (O’Brien et al, 2013, p. 422). As Pitts (2008, p. 70) observes, networks 
have functional requirements: 
…the drugs business is a business, requiring a relatively elaborate division 
of labour within a large workforce, which must maintain and protect the 
supply chain: market, package and distribute the product, protect the key 
players, silence would-be whistle-blowers, collect debts and ensure contract 
compliance. 
The enterprise conception of criminal network infers, certainly for children 
considering a career in this ‘business’, that engagement, participation and 
succession are essentially rational acts based on clear and understandable 
motivations (McGloin and Nguyen, 2011, p. 19); among them much desired kudos, 
‘inclusion, success and protection otherwise denied to them’ (Pitts, 2008, p. 84). 
However, networks may have further 
profound and institutional effects in 
configuring the default settings for 
what an individual child believes are 
permissible (and possible) behaviours, 
attitudes and aspirations. Where family 
and kinship networks become central 
hubs of networks, such properties have 
been shown to be even more confining, infused as they are by links characterised 
by mutual trust and obligation (Fader, 2016). In her study based in Limerick, 
Hourigan observes that many extended families ‘may be deeply enmeshed in feuds 
and drug-related activity’ (Hourigan, 2011, p. 144), suggesting a fuzzying effect at 
neighbourhood level to what, at face value, may seem clear oil-and-water separation 
of heroes and villains. Immersion in this type of network, combined with seclusion 
from external influence, is considered significant in predicting ongoing retention, 
given that pro-social ‘bridges’ may have already been burned (Densley, 2012, p. 314). 
For the State, such influences may also present ‘conscious opposition’ (Sparrow, 2008, 
pp. 199–214) to intervention. 
It is the capacity of networks to 
encourage and direct behaviour 
that is of particular interest to 
this study. 
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It is reasonable to assert that this aggregation of adversities may coalesce to 
become effectively the child’s day-to-day ‘cognitive map’ (Kaplan, 1984, p. 30), 
significantly bounded by a redundant network of friends and associates, copper-
fastened by a climate of ‘pervasive fear’ (von Lampe, 2011, p. 153) and, in some cases, 
bewildered by an ambiguous (albeit reluctant) affiliation (Pitts, 2008, p. 64) between 
neighbourhood and criminal network. 
Relationships and ties within 
a criminal network can be so 
fundamental that only escape from 
the respective neighbourhood and 
the complete severance of ties may be 
potent enough to offset the network’s 
influence or avoid exit-related wrath 
(Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 419). This 
process of exiting has been referred 
to as ‘knifing off’, and while this 
describes physical separation, it has 
also referred to necessary cognitive ‘knifing off’ (i.e. transformed values, attitudes 
and beliefs) if any change is to be sustained (Maruna and Roy, 2007, p. 118). Both 
of these acts of separation can be difficult, as relinquishing links will often mean 
relinquishing long-held relationships (Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 423). 
Intervening to reduce network effect
The literature in this area has usefully highlighted that criminal networks have 
needs (to sustain and to succeed) and corresponding vulnerabilities (or ‘situational 
contingencies’) (von Lampe, 2011, p. 157), which can be targeted using reverse 
engineering tactics, to suppress criminal activity. Referring to the infamous French 
Connection heroin-smuggling ring in the 1970s, Sparrow outlines how the law 
enforcement analyst working on the case determined that the entire operation relied 
heavily on a small set of specialists – called courier-recruiters – operating in French 
airports, and that by frustrating the activities of this one specific role, the whole 
network could be incapacitated (Sparrow, 2008, pp. 27–28). 
Network vulnerabilities can also relate to less obvious, deeper-set cognitive 
factors. The Boston ‘Operation Ceasefire’ strategy focused on a key presumption 
made by members of criminal gangs, that they would not be apprehended. Braga 
and Weisburd report how ‘Operation Ceasefire’ sought to undermine this sense 
of complacency by relevant authorities pulling every lever to suppress certain 
gang behaviours and communicating this intent directly to gang members, 
‘making explicit cause-and-effect connections between the behaviour of the target 
population and the behaviour of the authorities’ (Braga and Weisburd, 2012, p. 328).
Immersion in this type of network, 
combined with seclusion from 
external influence, is considered 
significant in predicting ongoing 
retention, given that pro-social 
‘bridges’ may have already 
been burned… 
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Summary
Risk science has delivered significant benefits in terms of our understanding of youth 
crime. However, its greatest contribution is in describing or explaining features of 
general populations, or analysis of larger offending subpopulations. The literature 
relating to the smaller groups of children involved in disproportionate amounts 
of offending behaviour and abnormal offending trajectories is less extensive, less 
certain and less universally applicable. 
In a general sense, network analysis is a potentially useful tool for understanding 
the complexity of such phenomena, which may involve multiple actors aligned, for 
whatever reason, in some overall endeavour, and be governed by powerful group-
specific institutional influences on attitudes and behaviour.  
A small but growing international literature relating to criminal networks identifies 
particular properties which have a bearing on crime and children’s involvement in 
crime. The ‘network as enterprise’ discourse identifies key status or pull dynamics for 
children and young people becoming involved in criminal networks. Other evidence 
also identifies darker push dynamics, driven by the influence of criminal actors. These 
influences can discourage pro-social behaviour, block network exit routes, bound 
rational choice and, by helping to negatively reframe local cultural attitudes to criminal 
behaviour, muddle a child’s reasoning in making ‘right and wrong’ judgements.
The motivations for children joining 
criminal networks, the factors that 
promote children’s retention in 
networks (or desistance from network 
activity), and the role that community 
and neighbourhood factors play in 
deepening or prolonging juvenile 
criminal careers have not attracted 
widespread attention in Ireland. This 
study aimed to contribute further to this 
area of knowledge development.
These influences can 
discourage pro-social 
behaviour, block network exit 
routes, bound rational choice 
and, by helping to negatively 
reframe local cultural attitudes 
to criminal behaviour, muddle 
a child’s reasoning in making 
‘right and wrong’ judgements. 
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This chapter initially summarises the overall methodological approach. It outlines 
the process of selection for the location of the case study, specifies the data sources 
used, and describes the methods of data collection, coding and analysis.
Overview 
The methodology is based on five key elements which are broadly sequential: 
• An analysis of national PULSE data was undertaken to identify burglary and 
drugs for sale and supply offences committed by children under the age of 
18 years.2 These data were then ranked by the Garda Sub-District on the basis 
of frequency of occurrence during 2010–2011 (Table 2.1).
• Greentown was selected as the most suitable area for the case study, based 
on its position in the ranking exercise (see Table 2.1), geographical location 
and other key practical considerations. 
• A network map was constructed by An Garda Síochána Analysis Service. The 
map was based on data which specifically related to Greentown, indicating 
links between co-offenders which, according to PULSE, were suspected of 
involvement in burglary and/or drugs for sale and supply offences during 
2010–2011. 
• The network map was examined in detail on site in Greentown (using the 
Twinsight3 method designed specifically for this study), by local Gardaí who 
had personal knowledge of the individuals identified.
• A process of coding, analysis and abstraction of verbatim transcripts 
disclosed patterns and themes to assist in the understanding of the network’s 
operation.
The study received ethical clearance by Queen’s University Belfast on 9 May 2013.4
1:  Ranking of Garda Sub-Districts based on burglary and drugs for 
sale and supply offences committed by children
Burglary and drugs for sale and supply as potential predictors of network activity?
Burglary is associated with repeat offending in Ireland.5 As Figure 2.1 indicates, 
offences such as Theft from Vehicle, Unlawful Taking (Vehicle) and Burglary are 
more likely to be linked to prolific offenders than offences such as Assault Minor, 
Trespass, and Drunkenness.
2 The rationale for choosing these offences as added criteria is explained in Step 2 of the case study selection 
process.
3 Twinsight is a data collection method designed by the researcher specifically for this study to meet anonymity 
concerns while, at the same time, attempting to personalise comments made by interview respondents about 
individuals in the Greentown network.
4 To obtain a copy of the full Ethics Statement, contact the report author and researcher, Sean Redmond. 
5 See table of offence categories and recidivism rates in the Irish Prison Service Recidivism Study (Irish Prison 
Service 2013, p. 13, Table 4.4) identifying burglary as the offence category with the highest recidivism rate at 
79.5%, and exceeding the second highest category (damage to property and to the environment) by 7.5%.
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Figure 2.1: Common non-traffic offences by offender type with higher levels of 
prolific offender (navy sections) to the left
Burglary was targeted for this study in particular because if a child is involved in 
burglary, there are offence-related functional supports which they may need to 
resource from relationships with others, and it was hypothesised that these were 
predictive of network association. Presumed requirements include: transport to get 
to and from burglary sites (particularly in non-urban areas); assistance in the transit 
of stolen goods; assistance in the sale and disposal of stolen goods, to transform 
stolen goods into cash (Ilan, 2013, p. 8); coaching and mentoring (McGloin and 
Nguyen, 2011, p. 6); and intelligence, for example, to identify which goods are of 
value and where they can be sourced – so-called ‘social facilitators’ for crime (von 
Lampe, 2011, p. 150).  
It was considered less likely that such functional supports would be required at the 
same level for offences such as Theft from Vehicle and Unlawful Taking (Vehicle).
Similar to burglary offences, logic determines that a child involved in drugs for 
sale and supply offending simply cannot act alone. This logic is supported by the 
existing literature, including studies of whole drugs enterprises from production 
to sales, identifying complex logistics chains with varying roles, responsibilities, 
competencies, assets, and vulnerabilities (Malm and Bichler, 2011), notwithstanding 
the fact that at local community level activity is more likely to focus on the retail 
end of the chain. 
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Burglary and drugs for sale and supply offences were thus considered appropriate 
selection-refining criteria, given their plausible association with serious and persistent 
offending and more likely to be predictive of collaborative or network activity.
A ratings table was constructed identifying localities (Garda Sub-Districts) where 
children were detected for burglary or drugs for sale and supply offences (2009–2011). 
Table 2.1 provides a ranking of Garda Sub-Districts (using fictitious names),6 showing 
the top 20 of 326 Sub-Districts. The ranking is based on the frequency of detections 
for minors involved in drugs for sale and supply, burglary, and robbery offences,7 
specifying both offences and individual offenders.
Table 2.1: Ranking of all Garda Sub-Districts (2010–2011) based on frequency of 
detections for drugs for sale and supply, burglary, and robbery offences by minors
Offences 2010 and 2011 offender  
aged 17 or less
Number of unique offenders  
2010 and 2011
Rank Location
01 Drugs 
for sale 
or supply
02 
Burglaries
03 
Robberies Total
01 Drugs 
for sale or 
supply
02 
Burglaries
03 
Robberies Total
1 Bluetown 28 4 2 34 20 4 2 26
2 Redtown 23 61 27 111 15 33 21 69
3 Yellowtown 21 12 13 46 15 7 4 26
4 Orangetown 18 10 13 41 14 1 8 23
5 Whitetown 17 7 16 40 5 2 13 20
6 Blacktown 16 23 13 52 12 8 5 25
7 Greytown 13 23 11 47 11 12 4 27
8 Browntown 12 5 5 22 9 3 3 15
9 Purpletown 12 3 31 46 6 1 19 26
10 Pinktown 11 15 15 41 6 6 3 15
11 Greentown 10 17 23 50 8 13 11 32
12 Area 12 9 31 23 63 9 19 14 42
13 Area 13 9 6 4 19 2 4 4 10
14 Area 14 6 40 41 87 6 13 21 40
15 Area 15 6 5 2 13 6 5 2 13
16 Area 16 5 13 7 25 5 7 7 19
17 Area 17 5 3 13 21 5 1 7 13
18 Area 18 5 8 4 17 5 4 3 12
19 Area 19 5 2 1 8 5 1 1 7
20 Area 20 5 12 0 17 4 9 0 13
Source: Central Statistics Office 2013
6 The confidential version of this list, identifying actual Sub-District locations, is retained by An Garda 
Síochána Analysis Service.
7 The original intention had been to include robbery offences as a selection criterion. On reflection, however, it 
was excluded from the network analysis, as the researcher judged robbery events as less likely to be reliant on 
support from adults. It is retained in this table for illustrative purposes only.
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Greentown (highlighted in 
navy strip in Table 2.1) is ranked 
eleventh for drugs for sale and 
supply; sixth for burglary; fourth 
for robberies; and fifth for total 
drugs for sale and supply, burglary 
and robbery offences committed 
by minors. Greentown is ranked 
fourth of 326 for the total number 
of offenders.
2. Greentown as a case study location
In order to make the final choice of locality, a number of additional selection 
considerations were then applied to the shortlist. These included:
• How ‘contained’, observable or identifiable the criminal activity identified  
in the ranking exercise was likely to be in reality. 
• Ensuring that the number of young people involved in burglary and  
drugs for sale and supply offences in the locality was sufficient to make  
the study viable.
• The willingness of local Garda management and Garda members to 
participate and meaningfully engage in the study.8
• Facilities in the locality which would be conducive to undertaking  
the fieldwork.9
Greentown was selected using the process outlined above, which was designed 
to limit opportunity for researcher bias. The researcher’s only input related to an 
assessment of which localities shortlisted by the quantitative exercises would yield 
the richest data and best facilitate data collection. 
Greentown is a busy Garda Sub-District located outside of Dublin. In terms of 
national comparisons, as identified in Table 2.1, Greentown featured significantly 
regarding the numbers of children involved in burglary, drugs for sale and supply 
(and robbery). Unlike a large urban location, such as Dublin, which would increase 
the likelihood of offending across Sub-Districts, it was believed that a regional 
location would increase the probability of offending occurring within the home  
Sub-District. It was presumed that this is in turn would mean that Garda respondents 
should have better knowledge of both the individuals involved in offending and the 
actual offending events. 
8 Advice was taken on this from senior Garda management.
9 Ideal specifications for this facility were: a room free from distraction with close proximity to the home 
Garda Station, reasonable soundproofing and, ideally, laid out reasonably informally; availability of light 
refreshments (e.g. tea and coffee).
Burglary and drugs for sale and 
supply offences were thus considered 
appropriate selection-refining criteria, 
given their plausible association 
with serious and persistent offending 
and more likely to be predictive of 
collaborative or network activity.
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The study provides only general descriptors for Greentown, observing assurances 
to An Garda Síochána regarding anonymity at individual and locality level. As with 
all confidential and sensitive data relating to the study, such material was passed on 
to the Analysis Service of An Garda Síochána. Access to any of these data for future 
study will require prior authorisation by An Garda Síochána.
3. The Greentown network map
The focal point of the study is the Greentown criminal network. The network is 
illustrated by an evidence-based graphic produced specifically for this study (to the 
researcher’s specifications) by An Garda Síochána Analysis Service using PULSE 
data. Figure 2.2 illustrates the approach to constructing the Greentown network, 
which is based on offending relationships involving co-offenders detected for 
burglary and/or drugs for sale and supply offences in Greentown during 2010–2011.
Figure 2.2: Constructing the Greentown network
The network was constructed by linking individuals through common incidents 
(involving both minors and adults). All individuals had an address in the 
Greentown Sub-District during 2010–2011 and all offences occurred within the 
Greentown Sub-District. A green link indicates that one or more burglary offences 
link the respective individuals. A red link indicates that one or more drugs for sale/
supply offences link the respective individuals. A blue link indicates other relevant 
crime types which link individuals.10
10 Garda analysts used their discretion with blue links where they believed that an offending link other than 
burglary or drugs for sale and supply would add to the understanding of the illustration. Thicker lines linking 
respective individuals indicated a greater number of detections connecting them. 
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The Greentown network was constructed at Garda Headquarters in Dublin without 
input by the researcher or Gardaí from Greentown. The exclusion of the researcher 
from this process was intended as an important element in meeting assurances 
regarding the protection of confidentiality and anonymity and limiting researcher bias.
The network map for the semi-structured interviews was provided in PDF format, 
with agreed read-only usage of the data, thereby precluding researcher manipulation 
of the data. Two versions of the Greentown network were constructed, one a ‘zoom-
in’ version, the other a ‘zoom-out’ or ‘birds-eye’ version. Figure 2.3 shows the ‘zoom-
in’ version. This version was used as the key reference for examination of the 
network in semi-structured interviews.
Prior to the site-based interviews, the utility of the network map was tested by a 
national workshop involving Juvenile Liaison Officers selected from localities 
across Ireland which had the highest rates of burglary and drugs for sale and 
supply involving children. Adaptations to the network map and to the approach to 
interviews were made based on feedback from this event. 
The network map formed the basis of examination in individual interviews with 
16 members of An Garda Síochána based locally in Greentown. Respondents 
were selected by local Garda management based on their personal knowledge of 
individuals identified in (the confidential version of) the Greentown network. The 
data collection strategy for semi-structured interviews is illustrated in Appendix 1.
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Figure 2.3: Greentown network ‘zoom-in’ magnification with identifier codes for 
use in semi-structured interviews
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While the illustration actually encompasses four networks, Network 1 is the most 
significant in terms of number, involving 31 individuals (all male) with age ranges 
from 11 to 36 years. The individuals in Network 1 were linked through 48 separate 
incidents: nine burglaries, two aggravated burglaries, five theft/other, five trespass, 
four arsons, four handling stolen property, three assaults causing harm, two drugs 
for sale/supply, and 14 other offences.
Due to time and resource considerations, and the fact that only one child appears 
outside of Network 1, this network became the main frame of analysis (see Appendix 2) 
and, from this point on, is referred to simply as the Greentown network. 
Figure 2.4 shows the second 
version of the network. This is a 
bird’s-eye view, which provides a 
more panoramic view of offending 
relationships in Greentown and 
includes all offences with linked 
suspects committed in Greentown 
2010–2011, as opposed to only 
burglary or drugs for sale and 
supply. Two reference points are 
provided (zoom-in and bird’s-eye 
versions) because, as Campana 
has pointed out more recently 
(2016, p. 5), the issue of drawing a categorical offence-related boundary around the 
Greentown network could be problematic. The zoom-out facility permitted interview 
respondents to check their bearings with a wider reference outside of the more 
detailed coded network during interview. 
An individual’s gender is identified by a colour code: blue for male and pink for 
female. Adults (over 18 years) are represented by the nodes that are dark pink and 
dark blue and children (under-18s) by those that are light pink and light blue. This is 
necessary in the bird’s-eye view version because there is no supporting information 
relating to age and there is no unique identifier for each individual. 
The individuals in Network 1 were 
linked through 48 separate incidents: 
nine burglaries, two aggravated 
burglaries, five theft/other, five 
trespass, four arsons, four handling 
stolen property, three assaults 
causing harm, two drugs for sale/
supply, and 14 other offences.
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Figure 2.4: Greentown network ‘zoom-out’ magnification also known as  
‘bird’s-eye view’
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4. Examining the Greentown network map 
This section outlines in detail the design, approach and methods for data collection. 
It introduces Twinsight, a method designed by the researcher for navigating the 
network and for pinpointing incidents without disclosing confidential case-related 
information.11
Appendix 3 illustrates the method used by the researcher and the respondents to 
navigate the network. 
‘Twinsight’
A key feature of the design of the semi-structured interviews undertaken with 
locally based members of An Garda Síochána was the development of an innovative 
technique called Twinsight. Twinsight separated the researcher from personal and 
confidential data, permitting access to concealed data using the ‘zoom-in’ network 
referring only to reference points as opposed to individual identities. 
One version of the Greentown network map was ‘live’, i.e. it contained personal 
details of the individuals involved, accompanied by a unique identifier (reference 
code) for each individual. This version was only ever seen by Garda members or 
analysts. It was concealed securely and was used by Garda respondents in the semi-
structured interviews to link unique code identifiers with real cases.
The second version was a near exact match with the first version, with one key 
exception. Any personal information that could identify the individual in the 
network was removed. During the interviews, the researcher used only this 
second, anonymised version. Both versions shared the same identifier codes, 
permitting both researcher and respondent to focus on the same individual or the 
same link. The use of anonymous but unique identifier codes permitted precise 
and simultaneous identification of individuals (Twinsight) for discussion, while 
observing ethical requirements to use only anonymised data. The questions listed 
below illustrate how the researcher used this technique in practice:
• ‘Let’s discuss some of the obvious key players and links; can you identify 
two or three that you believe you know best, and/or believe to be most 
important?’
• (Focusing on two or three individuals chosen by the interviewee) ‘If we take 
these individuals one by one, from your own knowledge, how do you think 
they ended up in the situation we’re looking at? Try and go back to the first 
time you encountered them and describe the path from that point until this 
network was created.’ 
• (With reference to X individual) ‘Who would you say had the biggest 
influence on their becoming part of the network and engaging in the 
network’s activities? Can you tell me a little bit about what this relationship 
looks like and how it may have come about?’
11 In the original study, this method was titled Battleships. The name Battleships was chosen because the use of 
anonymous but case-sensitive codes permitted, as in the game Battleships, precise pinpointing of individual 
targets from a remote location. 
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Respondents were actively encouraged to ‘ground’ their opinions by linking 
observations and experiences of key issues to individuals on the network map, using 
the unique identifier. Linking opinions to events and individuals as opposed to simply 
documenting opinions about crime and the causes of crime was a conscious attempt 
to improve the basis of the evidence. Furthermore, accounts of ‘individuals and events’ 
provided fixed reference points that could be triangulated by analysis of individual 
Garda perspectives of the same individuals and events. The following observation 
from an interview respondent is a good illustration of the utility of the method.
Garda: ‘…so the top family A2 (he might not be on his own like … but his 
family) might get drugs, they might dish them out in large quantities 
to D1, E1 and A1 and then they will in turn break them up into smaller 
groups and give them to the likes of U1 who needs them. And U1 is paying 
these guys massive money that he can’t really afford to get back and U1 is 
dishing them out all over the place … in really small 25 (euro) bags…’
5. Coding and analysis of data 
The approach to coding and data analysis was significantly informed by grounded 
theory literature and, in particular, the constant comparative method (Glaser and 
Strauss, 2009).12
Once collected, data were imported into 
NVivo, a computer-assisted qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS). 
Data comprised statistical reports, the 
network map provided in PDF format by 
Garda analysts, and (once transcribed) 
records of semi-structured interviews. 
Audio files were transcribed verbatim 
using Dragon voice recognition 
software.
Demonstrating a clear audit trail, where each stage of the process can be available 
for scrutiny, is a necessity in undertaking good-quality research (Yin, 2008; Gibbert 
et al, 2008, p. 1468). All data in NVivo were clearly filed, and trains of thought could 
be mapped given that these theory-building journeys are logged by the software, 
transaction by transaction. Appendix 6 outlines in detail the analytical strategy from 
open coding to the development of themes and propositions. 
12 Grounded theory, deriving from the seminal work of Bernard Glaser and Anselm Strauss, provides ‘a 
systematic method of analysing and collecting data to develop middle-range theories’ (Charmaz, 2012, p.1) 
and is particularly apposite for exploration of phenomenon and contexts which present with low paradigm 
(Thomas et al, 2011, p. 1075) levels of pre-existing knowledge.
Respondents were actively 
encouraged to ‘ground’ their 
opinions by linking observations 
and experiences of key issues to 
individuals on the network map, 
using the unique identifier.
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Summary
Previous research in the area of youth crime has looked at individual offenders or 
groups of offenders (including a smaller number of studies on networks). This study 
adopted an innovative approach by focusing on the individual as the basic unit of 
enquiry within the context of a criminal network.
The value of applying a network frame to analysis has been demonstrated by 
examples as varied as locating patterns of contagion identified in water pipes by 
the public health pioneers in cholera-infected 19th-century London; understanding 
organisational behaviours; or examining the influences that cultivate, facilitate and 
sustain criminal activity, in particular, in local neighbourhoods. 
In this study, the use of Garda data to provide the evidence base that a network 
existed (by showing the relationships between individuals based on detected 
offences) is, in itself, new. Secondly, the use of the network map for closer 
examination with local Gardaí enabled the researcher to ground the evidence of 
respondents in the context of individuals and real events, rather than opinion. 
Finally, the Twinsight technique designed by the researcher facilitated examination 
of the Greentown network and its individual members, while simultaneously 
satisfying prior assurances and requirements in relation to anonymity and 
confidentiality. These related to non-disclosure of Greentown’s location, protection 
of the identities of individuals discussed in the study, and of Garda respondents who 
contributed to the study. 
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Limitations
Notwithstanding the strengths of the methodological approach and controls on 
researcher bias, there are a number of points that must be acknowledged.
First, the network map was prepared by Garda analysts based on PULSE data. 
However, these data were statistically manipulated to meet prescribed parameters 
(burglary and drugs for sale and supply offences) which contrived to cluster the 
individuals together on the map. Therefore, the network map itself is an artificial 
construct, although based on concrete evidence. Garda members were then asked, 
based on their experience, what they could deduce from the network map. In 
effect, the study findings are therefore the researcher’s interpretation of Garda 
respondents’ interpretation of a construct based on PULSE data.
Second, prescriptions of ‘time’ (2010–2011) and ‘offence type’ (burglary and drugs 
for sale and supply) determined who, from the total population in Greentown, did 
and did not appear in the network map. These criteria yielded 31 individuals in 
the case of the largest network, Network 1, which became the focus of the study. 
Clear weaknesses were evident in terms of the degree to which some individuals 
were represented. One particular individual was over-represented because he 
was involved with one anomalous burglary episode during the period, although 
otherwise peripheral to any network-related activity. At the other extreme, one 
individual, ‘the little fella’, was not included in the network map at all, due to the fact 
that during 2010–2011 he had not been associated with a burglary or drugs for sale 
and supply offence. However, he was forced into the scope of examination in spite of 
the criteria, by repeated and ‘concerned’ references from Garda respondents.13 
Third, the key data source that the network is built upon, PULSE, has its own 
limitations and weaknesses. The PULSE data used to build the network relied on 
events (and detections), and are obviously susceptible to the normal vulnerabilities 
associated with data inputted by human actors. 
During interviews with Garda respondents it became clear that although the PULSE-
generated network map provided a reasonable portrayal of offending relationships, 
it did not provide the detail and nuance required for a more complete account of 
links between individuals. Relying on the detection data alone actually had the 
potential to mislead if not treated cautiously, highlighting the importance of local 
intelligence.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, while three data sources were utilised for the 
study – PULSE data, the network map, and individual semi-structured interviews – it 
could be argued that they are, in fact, just three different iterations sourced from the 
same data pool, at best offering only ‘internal’ triangulation.
13 It is important to note the potential effects of the basic inclusion criteria (i.e. offence type and period in which 
committed) in setting the frame for analysis. 
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This chapter identifies four key findings:
1. The Greentown network existed and was hierarchical in nature.
2. The hierarchical structure in Greentown was supported by powerful 
processes and a sympathetic embedded culture.
3. Network power and influence is mediated by geography and by the degree 
of obligation and intensity of individual associate/client relationships with 
network patrons.
4. Network influences act to encourage and compel certain young children 
into abnormal patterns of criminal behaviour. 
Throughout this chapter, an important distinction is made between family members 
(individuals who have a blood relationship) and associates (individuals who are 
linked to each other in a variety of other ways). The significance of this particular 
distinction, as identified in other studies (e.g. Fader, 2016), becomes apparent as the 
findings are discussed.
Finding 1: The Greentown network existed and was hierarchical  
in nature 
Evidence to support the existence of the network was compelling. Prior to any 
significant employment of the Twinsight examination, the clear feedback from 
Garda interviewees was that the network map (constructed off-site by Garda 
analysts and based only on PULSE data) was largely accurate. The following 
exchange is representative:
Researcher, referring  
to the network map:
‘If I was to give you a score of 0 to 10 and said to you 
“look, 0 means no sense” and 10 means “this is a really 
accurate picture of what was going on in 2010–2011”, 
what score would you give it?’
Garda: ‘I’d give it about 7 … definitely … anyway.’ 
Researcher: ‘...that’s great. So 7 is a really high score, so why would 
you give it a 7?’
Garda: ‘…because I see here, you know, the green lines signify 
the burglary offences, those that you have linked with 
the green lines are very accurate for those that would 
have been committing those crimes. And those that 
you have in the drugs section is all very accurate. 
They’re all involved in those crimes…’
In terms of exploring the existence of ‘hierarchy’, the first stage in this process 
was to identify any disproportionately important, influential, and significant 
network actors. Analysis of ‘first sweep’ and ‘frequency of mention’ were key 
elements in this process. 
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When respondents were first asked to identify the individuals in the network 
they wanted to talk about (from the confined list of 31 in the network), each 
individual identified was coded as first sweep, as this was the respondent’s first 
cut at the network and would determine which individuals would feature initially 
in the discussion. The inherent assumption and logic here was that the group of 
individuals who were selected in the ‘first sweep’ would be those who figured more 
significantly in the minds of respondents. It should be noted that respondents were 
given no direction or guidance in the selection of individuals to discuss. Figure 3.1 
shows the frequencies of mentions of network members for first sweep of cases. 
Figure 3.1: First sweep of cases
Of interest here is that the top four positions (and a significant volume of first sweep 
discussion), involve a small number of individuals – A2, Z1, A1, and D1. 
Figure 3.2 represents the relative presence of individual actors in semi-structured 
interviews based on how many times each actor was mentioned across all 16 
interviews. Similar to first sweep, it is presumed that those individuals who are 
repeatedly referred to by the majority of respondents are likely to be perceived 
as more prominent. The total number of mentions is multiplied by the number of 
individual interviews where each actor was mentioned. Therefore, the highest ‘total 
frequency of mention’ scores were achieved by individuals who were mentioned 
on multiple occasions but also in multiple interviews.14 
14 The researcher assessed knowledge of the network by Garda respondents as follows: one respondent knew all the 
network participants, eight knew most, and seven knew some. None were gauged to have known few or none.
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
A2 Z1 A1 D1 N1 B2 S1 E1 Q1 G1 R1 F2 D2 B1 Y1 H2 C2 H1 M1 P1 P2 S2 U1 G2 K1 R2 T1 O1 Q2 X1
Lifting the Lid on Greentown30
The red columns identify eight individuals – A2, B2, D2, Z1, D1, E1, A1, and F2. Of 
note, three of these – A2, B2, and D2 – belong to the same family and kinship group 
in Greentown. 
Figure 3.2: Total ‘frequencies of mention’ of individual network participants by 
breadth of interviews 
When the ‘total frequencies of mention’ were compared with ‘first sweep frequencies 
of mention’ (from a potential 31 individuals), the top eight places are, with the 
exception of two individuals D2 (frequency of mentions exercise) and S1 (first sweep 
mentions exercise), sourced from the top 11 places for both exercises, as shown in 
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Top positions of ‘total frequencies of mention’ compared with ‘first 
sweep frequencies of mention’
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th
Frequency of mentions 
exercise
A2 D1 A1 Z1 B2 E1 D2 F2 N1 B1 G1
First sweep exercise A2 Z1 A1 D1 N1 B2 S1 G1 E1 Q1 F2
This dual frequency of a relatively small number of individuals being at the 
forefront in respondents’ minds and repeatedly referred to over the duration of 
most interviews suggests that this relatively small group is more important than the 
majority of other network participants. 
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The results of an exercise linking individual network participants with any interview 
references to power are shown in Figure 3.3. The same individuals occupy the top 
four positions. (Note: NVivo search tools permitted the identification of these 
correlations given that Garda members interviewed were encouraged as far as 
possible to tie opinions to individual network members.)
Figure 3.3: Referencing ‘power’ to network participants
Similar exercises in relation to 
leadership and influence revealed 
similar patterns and clusters as 
those conducted for first sweep, total 
frequency of mention, and power. 
Of significance is the fact that A2’s 
presence consistently dominates 
along with, to a lesser extent, D1, 
Z1 and A1. These data appear to 
indicate repeat patterns associated 
with a small cohort of key leading 
players in the network, supporting 
the plausibility of a hierarchical 
structure within the network. 
However, this structure appears to be informal, with fluid dynamic properties. 
Respondents indicated that since the period of study (2010–2011) the network has 
experienced changes of roles and seniorities,15  individuals’ stocks have risen and 
fallen, and new alliances have emerged within it. However, it is also clear that the 
personal and social capital of certain individuals have remained relatively stable. 
15 Interview 015/064: For example, A2’s cousin emerging as a new leader.
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D2
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All others
combined
References to power
…a relatively small number of 
individuals being at the forefront in 
respondents’ minds and repeatedly 
referred to over the duration of 
most interviews suggests that 
this relatively small group is more 
important than the majority of 
other network participants. 
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Family members (blood relations)
Each of the key individuals in the network is now briefly profiled in a pen-picture 
based on representative interview data. 
A2 (male aged 29 years) is considered by all respondents as the clear 
leader of the network, the head man and next in line to take over a 
multigenerational, family-based criminal organisation. A2 has, over 
a significant period of time, presided over a regime that governs the 
majority of network actors both in terms of their outward compliance and own self-
governance. He presents as a remote, elusive but controlling individual. Appendix 4 
contains an illustration of how he is perceived by Gardaí. 
A2 presents as polite and non-confrontational in his dealings with An Garda 
Síochána. This creative compliance with state actors is a behavioural norm 
expected by A2 of those most closely linked with him, including his family and 
kinship network and a small number 
of trusted associates, as a means to 
avoid undue and excessive Garda 
attention. His influence has served to 
shape young people’s behaviour. Even 
relatively senior network actors can be 
sanctioned for breach of this norm.16
In the past, A2 has been involved in burglary and is suspected of involvement in 
drugs for sale and supply, although he is far more likely, in recent years, to organise 
and supervise or contract this work to others. More recently, A2 has overseen 
a moneylending enterprise, which is used by certain vulnerable residents in 
Greentown, drug users and associate members of his own network. Importantly, 
these financial and criminal activity-related transactions impose obligations on 
debt-ridden clients to a small number of network patrons. A2 uses middle-ranking 
members of the network such as A1, D1 and E1 to enforce debt repayment. To some 
children who live on the same estate, A2 represents a clear example that crime pays.
B2 (male aged 15 years) is an immediate family member of A2 who 
lives close by in the same estate. B2 uses his family name to confirm 
his significant social capital and he is both revered and feared by young 
people in his immediate neighbourhood. In his early adolescence 
B2 was considered impetuous and 
impulsive by A2. However, he has now 
emerged as a player, mixing more with 
family members than the associates he 
used to mix with. B2 is now more trusted 
by A2 in terms of management of the 
family brand and is seen as a future heir 
to control the network.
16 For example, E1 was disciplined by A2 for being rude to a Garda (Interview 012/019).
A2 (male aged 29 years) is 
considered by all respondents as 
the clear leader of the network. 
B2 uses his family name to confirm 
his significant social capital and 
he is both revered and feared by 
young people in his immediate 
neighbourhood.
A2
 – 29 years
B2
 – 15 years
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D2 (male aged 12 years) is also an immediate family member of A2. D2 
appears to be encouraged in criminality by A2, but equally sheltered 
by him, partly because his younger age may make him more prone to 
disclosing something about A2 that he should not. 
D2 carries authority significantly disproportionate to his age. He appears to be able 
to gauge the potency of evidence against him on matters that he is suspected of and, 
on the advice of his parents, knows when to accept a caution. D2 offers street advice 
and counsel to other children on offence-related matters and uses strategies similar 
to those of adult members of his family for encounters with An Garda Síochána.
Like B2, D2 derives capital from the family brand and many of the local children are 
afraid of him. The ‘birds-eye’ version of the network indicates relationships between 
D2 and younger children at the 
periphery of the network and, like 
A2, he is considered to be becoming 
adept at distancing himself from 
offending incidents through the use 
of others. 
Associates (i.e. not part of A2’s family and kinship group)
Z1 (male aged 28 years) is an intriguing character, originating from 
outside Greentown. Z1 is not a family member of A2’s, but they have had 
a long and close association, and he is considered a lieutenant of A2 and 
his second-in-command, by most but not all respondents. Z1 is considered 
to be A2’s confidant, always in his company, and joint architect with A2 of serious 
offending events. Like A2, Z1 selects his closest associates very carefully. Z1 appears 
to be a network entrepreneur; he has links to individuals outside Greentown in terms 
of ‘fencing’ stolen goods and, together with S2 (which is not disclosed by the network 
map), provides a network crossing point for burglary and drugs for sale and supply.
D1 (male aged 20 years) is considered part of Greentown network’s 
middle management under the influence of A2, and regards A2 as a 
figure to aspire to. D1’s family background was considered chaotic and 
he is seen as having been involved in criminal behaviour from an early 
age, particularly car crime, prior to his full engagement with the network.
Z1
 – 28 years
D1
 – 20 years
D2
 – 12 years
D2 carries authority significantly 
disproportionate to his age. 
Z1 is considered to be A2’s 
confidant, always in his company.
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D1 developed a reputation for not 
caring about adverse consequences 
of his behaviour and for being 
willing to do anything for money,17  
including enforcing discipline on 
behalf of A2. His older brothers were 
all involved with A2 and have spent 
significant periods of time in prison. 
This familial involvement, combined 
with physical or geographical proximity, is associated with D1’s closer connection 
to A2. D1 has a reputation for driving proficiency but is not considered to have the 
right temperament or intelligence to become leader of the network. D1 is part of 
a smaller friendship group with E1 and A1 capable of operating alone, although 
lacking the sophistication of crimes organised by A2 and more likely to be detected. 
D1 is seen as controller and recruiter of new participants (e.g. F2 and other children). 
D1 has shown dissent to A2, which was punished, indicating that even relatively 
senior members of the network are subject to summary justice by A2.
E1 (male aged 19 years) is a close, long-time associate of D1 and 
neighbour to D1, A2, D2, and B2. E1 and D1 are often mentioned in the 
same breath by respondents when discussing their activities and their 
relationship to A2’s family. E1 does not appear to have experienced 
the same sibling pressure as D1, in terms of older brothers who had been routinely 
involved in crime and with A2 in particular. While E1 has, in collaboration with 
D1, been very closely connected to A2’s operations, more recently he has also 
developed links with other key players outside Greentown.
A1 (male aged 18 years) is often seen in the company of D1 and E1, 
although he does not live in the same part of Greentown. A1 was known 
to Gardaí as a child and is remembered for his hostility to authority, an 
attitude that appears not to have been tempered as he has grown older. 
A1’s family background was considered chaotic; his father had chronic alcohol 
problems and the family had an openly confrontational relationship with An Garda 
Síochána. A1 has been involved 
in multiple offending episodes 
with D1, in particular burglary, as 
well as activity on behalf of A2, 
including debt collection. The 
offending relationship with D1 
continued beyond the time span 
of the Greentown network map 
and he is one of a small number of 
17 Interview 011/010 gives the example of D1 and E1 being involved in an attack on a nightclub. Interview 
013/022 identifies D1 and E1’s involvement in criminal damage and arson on behalf of A2.
D1 has shown dissent to A2, which 
was punished, indicating that even 
relatively senior members of the 
network are subject to summary 
justice by A2.
While E1 has, in collaboration with 
D1, been very closely connected to 
A2’s operations, more recently he has 
also developed links with other key 
players outside Greentown.
E1
 – 19 years
A1
 – 18 years
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associates who has ‘enjoyed’ a longer-term relationship with A2. A1 was involved in 
the recruitment and mentoring of F2 (see below), a child, whom he lives close to. It is 
believed that A1 and D1 have benefited from the proceeds of burglaries committed 
by F2 and a younger cohort of 
children. A1’s role in recruitment 
and mentoring included developing 
a paternalistic relationship with 
the mother of another individual 
known as ‘the little fella’ (see below) 
while ‘the little fella’ was spending 
time outside Greentown in State 
residential care. 
F2 (male aged 13 years) is considered by many to be the child member 
of the network who had become most involved in serious offending 
over the study period. F2’s family background was chaotic. His father 
is considered to have been absent in F2’s upbringing, living elsewhere 
in Greentown. An uncle of F2’s involved him very early on in offending behaviour, 
including aggravated burglary. In addition to being considered a prolific offender in 
his own right, F2 has himself been instrumental in recruiting members of his own 
network, including ‘the little fella’. 
F2 and his young offending group were responsible for a spate of burglary and 
robbery offences, and appear to represent a chaotic fringe to the network. F2 and 
his group engaged in excessive alcohol and drugs consumption in the company of 
D1 and A1 (who were some seven years older than him), and F2 is considered to be 
significantly under A1 and D1’s influence more generally. F2 is seen as an individual 
with a strong character who will become one of the more significant adult members 
ensuring, it is argued, the network’s progression to the next generation of associates. 
Despite F2’s lower status, his primary relationship being with A1 and D1, he is not 
beyond the coercive reach of A2.
‘The little fella’18 (male aged 12 years) 
does not appear on the network 
map. However, he is included in 
the narrative account here because 
of repeated references to him by 
respondents. ‘The little fella’ was 
considered to be an individual of 
significant concern in 2014, when the 
study was undertaken, not just for 
18 The term ‘the little fella’ is used because this and ‘the young fella’ is how he was described by respondents. 
The term seems to convey (if nothing else) the respondents’ perception of him relative to the physical size of 
other network actors.
F2 is seen as an individual with a 
strong character who will become 
one of the more significant adult 
members ensuring, it is argued, the 
network’s progression to the next 
generation of associates. 
F2
 – 13 years
A1 has been involved in multiple 
offending episodes with D1, in 
particular burglary, as well as 
activity on behalf of A2, including 
debt collection.
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crime, but also for welfare reasons. His mother appears to have had a significant 
drug problem. Welfare concerns precipitated his removal into residential care 
where his conduct and behaviour was considered very poor and disruptive. 
When he returned to Greentown, F2 engaged him with D1 and A1, for whom he 
became involved in carrying out burglary offences. ‘The little fella’s’ specific 
asset, notably his small size and slight build, is a valuable attribute, allowing him 
to crawl into small spaces or through windows of houses to open up premises for 
adults committing burglary. He is supplied drugs by D1 and is highly influenced 
by both D1 and A1. In one incident, 
‘the little fella’ was discovered by 
Gardaí in D1’s house, in a state of 
severe intoxication with other boys 
of a similar (young) age. Many 
respondents shared particular 
concerns about this young person 
in terms of predicting his likely 
deteriorating trajectory.
Summary
Finding 1 provides evidence supporting the existence of a network in Greentown 
and suggests that the Greentown network was hierarchical in nature. Specifically, 
it posits that hierarchical traits for Greentown can be detected in the data, and that 
the division between family and non-family is a key consideration in determining 
authority and status. 
Of the eight principal actors in the Greentown network (A2, B2, D2, Z1, D1, E1, A1, and 
F2), A2 presents as being a central and key influence. Z1’s position as A2’s second-
in-command and confidant appears to have been sustained over time. D1, A1 and E1 
present as both a quasi-autonomous close friendship group and as followers and middle 
management – committing offences, implementing punishment orders and undertaking 
debt collection – deriving much of their power and social capital directly from A2. 
During the period in question, 
D1 (aged 20) was cultivating a 
relationship with F2 (aged 13), who 
was considered to be a prolific 
offender in his own right and had 
progressed under D1’s mentorship. 
‘The little fella’ (aged 12) was 
significantly influenced by these 
actors and by A1, committing 
burglaries for D1 in return for drugs 
and the prestige of more senior 
association. 
‘The little fella’ was considered 
to be an individual of significant 
concern in 2014, when the study 
was undertaken, not just for crime, 
but also for welfare reasons. 
In one incident, ‘the little fella’ was 
discovered by Gardaí in D1’s house, 
in a state of severe intoxication 
with other boys of a similar (young) 
age. Many respondents shared 
particular concerns about this 
young person in terms of predicting 
his likely deteriorating trajectory. 
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It is clear that there is a superior and a subordinate class in the Greentown network, 
which tends to be divided (although not exclusively) between those who are part of 
A2’s family and kinship group and those who are not.19 The prestige of A2’s family is 
also evident in observations regarding D2 who, at the time, was 12 years of age. D2 
was seen to carry authority with adults, which is significantly disproportionate to his 
age; he commands fear and respect from other young people in the neighbourhood 
and was already distancing himself from the front line of criminal behaviour, 
preferring instead to stand back at a safe distance while others engage. 
Finding 2: The hierarchical structure in Greentown is supported  
by powerful processes and a sympathetic embedded culture
This section examines the issue of how contrived processes and culture support the 
loose hierarchical structure discussed in the previous section. It also considers how 
power is exercised in the Greentown network and how this, in turn, influences the 
behaviour of network (and other) participants. 
Process
A2’s ‘contractual relationships’ 
developed from direct involvement in 
serious crime to delegation of work to 
multiple network actors. This involves 
instrumental exchanges of cash from 
the proceeds of theft,20  rewards for 
acts of intimidation and enforcement 
on his behalf, and more sophisticated 
multi-actor operations.
Some of A2’s criminal activity relationships are direct, such as Z1, D1, A1 and E1; 
others are perhaps more indirect and distant, such as F2 and ‘the little fella’. As 
Appendix 5 illustrates, while actors such as A1 and D1 enter into a succession of 
agreements with A2, these are not walk-away propositions. It is generally believed 
that, despite their relative seniority, they cannot turn down a request from A2 and 
are required to share proceeds from their own criminal activity with him. 
Network associates can also become clients when they fall into debt, resulting in 
obligations. This provides an additional governance mechanism for A2. Routinely, 
this can mean payback of exorbitant loan fees; however, there were examples of 
client-debtors being coerced into crime, including individuals committing serious 
crime under the supervision of lieutenants or middle management.21
19 Z1 appears to be a singular exclusion to this rule.
20 Interview 007/007 provides an example of commissioning D1 to undertake a large-scale theft and to convey 
the stolen item to another source in return for a share of the proceeds. A2 is illustrated here as architect of 
the offence, providing intelligence and ‘a fence’ to dispose of the goods. This was offered as an example of A2 
creating clear water between himself and the crime. Further details of the event cannot be disclosed, in order 
to ensure anonymity.
21 Interview 013/020: A brother of N2 was forced to commit robberies due to a drug-related debt.
It is clear that there is a superior 
and a subordinate class in the 
Greentown network, which tends 
to be divided (although not 
exclusively) between those who 
are part of A2’s family and kinship 
group and those who are not. 
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The debt driver is formalised and 
normalised with the extension of 
A2’s activities into moneylending, 
which has been seen overall as a 
conscious choice by A2 and his 
family to become involved in such 
less risky ‘grey’ enterprises. A2’s 
involvement in this activity has had 
spillover effects, causing an escalation in criminal activity by newly engaged actors 
who have fallen into debt with A2 (often women) and have become involved in theft 
and shoplifting activities to service the debt. The following exchange between a 
Garda respondent and a shoplifter illustrates this point: 
Garda: ‘…I said “why are you shoplifting, you are never … I’ve never even 
heard of you before a year ago, like…?” (They are travelling, getting buses 
around all over the country stealing every day) … And she said: “Well I 
have no other option. I have to have the money every week for them … Or 
else like.”’
Moneylending activity also expands 
the territory of A2’s contract 
influence, involving (relatively) non-
associated drug users and a wider 
cohort of individuals and families 
characterised by vulnerability, where 
debts can be generated simply by 
engaging in a loan arrangement.  
The following quote conveys the 
context and consequence of the 
transaction well, identifying (a) the means of surety and (b) how the risks relating 
to repayment are mitigated by fear, geographic isolation and a low likelihood of 
detection. 
Garda: ‘He preys on the vulnerable, so … A lady would come looking for 
€300 for Christmas … He would give them the €300. They would pay off 
the €300 and he would tell them he wants €450 or €500 … He would take 
their dole cards or their social welfare cards on them … This is what he 
used to do, take the dole and the social welfare cards and give them to 
them on the day they were going to collect their dole … He would drive 
them there and when they came out they’d have to hand back the money … 
He would just keep extending the loan … In fairness to these people, they 
couldn’t come and report it to the Guards because … they would be afraid 
of repercussions … living in the estate on your own out there … 
…while actors such as A1 and D1 
enter into a succession of agreements 
with A2, these are not walk-away 
propositions.
Routinely, this can mean payback of 
exorbitant loan fees; however, there 
were examples of client-debtors 
being coerced into crime, including 
individuals committing serious crime 
under the supervision of lieutenants 
or middle management. 
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And that’s the way he ran about his business … He is technically … There’s 
nobody going to give evidence against him that he’d be caught … It’s a 
safer way of him doing his business than actually committing burglaries 
or road traffic or where the Guards can actually catch him … But unless 
we get a complaint from … a member of … that he’s lending money to … 
There’s nothing really the Guards can do about it, you know … And it’s 
very hard. I wouldn’t blame anyone … You probably know yourself living 
in the circumstances out there … For a young woman on her own with 
probably one or two kids, no husband … In a lot of cases the threat of 
something happening to them overrides actually going to the Guards, you 
know, and she’ll just pay off the loan and suddenly he will say … you don’t 
have to pay me anymore … maybe if you borrowed a loan for 300 he would 
get an extra thousand.’ (Interview 016, p. 18)
Debt and fear are powerful push factors, particularly in the context of an insular, 
redundant and ‘intensely parochial’ network (McGloin and Piquero, 2010; Pitts, 
2008). Corresponding and powerful pull factors are also clearly evident for children 
in particular. Money is seen as a key instrumental reason for engaging in a contract 
with A2 (or any other network patron) along with drugs (and combinations of money 
and drugs). According to respondents, certain children present as drawn towards 
key players seeking patronage, excitement and the acquisition of social capital 
by association. There is also evidence to suggest that A2’s approach to ‘contract’ 
has had a trickle-down effect, with acolytes such as D1 entering into similar 
transactional relationships with adults and children. 
Culture
A2’s family brand, linked to the use of violence in past feud-related conflicts, is 
used widely in regulating associate behaviour22  and in enforcing compliance more 
generally across the network. However, ongoing risk management is more efficiently 
sustained by perceptions, stories, myths and perceived panoptical surveillance by 
A2 and his family which, in turn, secure self-regulation by associates, clients and 
non-aligned residents in the estate where A2 lives. The following interview extract 
illustrates this point:
Garda: ‘…she can’t say anything because … I know she told me that she has 
told the detectives, but she says she is walking down the street now and she’s 
so paranoid because she thinks that they’re after finding out she is after 
saying something … Because they told her that she’d be buried with a straw in 
her mouth … Like if she told anyone or didn’t pay the money, like…’
22 An example is the disciplining of G1 and D1 with reference to their behaviour.
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B2 and D2 derive direct social capital 
from the family brand and they walk 
the estate with an air of ownership. 
A2 can be equally assured that 
young people, and even relatively 
senior young adults like D1 and E1, 
would never give evidence against 
him if they were caught executing a 
criminal action for him.
Network associates are often carefully selected for their personal vulnerability (e.g. 
C1),23  family history of criminal association through elder siblings (e.g. D1, A1), poor 
supervision (e.g. F2), parenting capacity compromised by alcohol and drugs misuse 
and absent or ineffective father figure (e.g. A1, B1, E1 and ‘the little fella’) or, more 
likely, combinations of these factors. Individuals who have client relationships with 
A2 are also well aware of the family’s capability of carrying through on debt-related 
threats and can be prompted into action by no more than a phone call.
Presumptions made by the criminal justice system regarding rational action 
demand attention here. Securing a conviction against A2 requires a complaint and 
an individual willing to follow the process through to court. The data suggest that 
this presumption falters at all levels. To begin with, A2 appears always to be very 
distant from the commission of a criminal act and there is a paucity of individuals 
willing to make complaints or offer witness evidence against him (or other network 
protagonists), whether they are simply residents in A2’s estate or have a more 
intense client relationship with him. 
Garda respondents complained of 
delay once an offence gets to court 
and a tendency to mitigate the 
seriousness of criminal behaviour 
by rolling offences together over long 
periods of time.
Summary
The study finds that A2 and his family have a powerful influence over associates, 
clients and non-aligned residents’ behaviour. Additionally, it appears that the 
criminal justice system is built on presumptions that are at odds with the lived 
reality of individuals who have any form of contact with A2 and the network. Taken 
together these influences support a culture of compliance and sustenance of 
network power and impact.
23 Interview 001/011: C1 is referred to as a vulnerable, harmless and soft loner who is taken advantage of  
by more manipulative members.
Individuals who have client 
relationships with A2 are also well 
aware of the family’s capability of 
carrying through on debt-related 
threats and can be prompted into 
action by no more than a phone call.
Securing a conviction against 
A2 requires a complaint and an 
individual willing to follow the 
process through to court. 
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Finding 3: Network power and influence is mediated by geography 
and by the degree of obligation and intensity of individual associate/
client relationships with network patrons
This section examines how power and influence are distributed across the network 
in particular and across Greentown more generally. It is argued that these forces are 
not spread evenly across Greentown and that the dominant subordinate relationship 
often trumps physical or geographical proximity alone. 
A2 and his family are generally 
well known across Greentown, even 
to those who have no connection 
with him or his family (non-aligned 
residents). One respondent observed 
that, even at a distance, residents 
in Greentown are unlikely to make 
complaints. A2’s family are described 
as ‘probably the most feared family in 
Greentown’. For example, even when 
compelling corroborating evidence 
was secured by An Garda Síochána in relation to a serious violent offence committed 
by A2 in a public area, no witnesses were willing to come forward. 
In essence, Greentown comprises two effectively mutually exclusive spaces. The first 
is ‘official’ Greentown where residents go about their normal lives and do not feel the 
Greentown network’s influence. The second, characterised by links to A2, is a close 
network of associates bound together by choice and/or misfortune. 
Responses suggest that this ‘parallel’ Greentown is a small, claustrophobic space, 
where everyone knows each other. While, generally, it could be reasonably expected 
that A2’s influence wanes with distance from his home estate, it can be experienced 
with its essential intensity by associates and clients irrespective of physical distance. 
Perhaps the highest and most sustained concentration of influence is experienced by 
associates and clients living in A2’s estate. It is believed that here those individuals 
who by choice and/or circumstance have become associates or clients of A2’s also 
forfeit basic freedoms and privacy. 
Responses clearly suggest that clients fear physical punishment by A2, or more likely 
A1, D1 and E1, in terms of debt retrieval. Fear of the consequences of their refusal 
to engage in crime is seen as a key 
driver of child associates’ behaviour. 
This sense of stifling proximity has 
been identified in other commentary 
(Pitts, 2008, p. 34) and is exemplified 
by D1’s reported experience of ‘feeling 
the pressure’, living as he does (along 
with E1) in A2’s immediate vicinity. 
…it appears that the criminal justice 
system is built on presumptions 
that are at odds with the lived 
reality of individuals who have 
any form of contact with A2 and 
the network. 
Responses suggest that this 
‘parallel’ Greentown is a small, 
claustrophobic space, where 
everyone knows each other. 
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Referring to the housing estate 
A2 lives in as ‘up there’ (described 
by one Garda respondent during 
interview) has a particular 
significance, characterising its 
physical distance from Greentown’s 
commercial and civic centre and 
conjuring up an inner world beyond 
the reach of the authorities, where 
the State’s official sovereignty is 
effectively contested by A2.  
A2’s family and kinship group have a large presence on the estate, operating, it 
is believed, as overt and widespread surveillance, fitting with Hourigan’s similar 
observations relating to criminal gangs in Limerick (2011, p. 95). Here, it is 
believed, A2 has cultivated a climate of fear, with B2 and D2 carrying authority and 
intimidation rights well beyond their actual age and maturity. It is thought that 
D2’s outwardly convivial interactions with members of An Garda Síochána may 
also have the more profound effect of convincing residents that the family has a 
special relationship with the Gardaí, serving to undermine their confidence in the 
authorities to alter the status quo. Living close to A2 leaves one exposed, remote and 
vulnerable, and this applies equally to ‘non-aligned’ residents. In the words of one 
Garda respondent, ‘we’re not there 24/7 to protect them if something does happen’.
The combination of remoteness and insular pressure means that residents in the 
estate have to choose which side they are on. However, between the black and white 
of ‘A2 or not A2’ is a grey ambiguity with myriad shades. 
Despite the adversity, the majority of individuals, families and children do not 
become involved. (However unlikely, this includes a brother of one of the key 
associate family groupings.)24  The default coping mechanism is stoicism; residents 
tend to keep their heads down or simply stay out of A2 and the network’s line of 
sight on the reasonable assumption that they will be left alone if they leave him 
alone. However, ‘coping’ with the 
regime also has consequences. 
Victims of crime or antisocial 
behaviour on the estate are unlikely 
to speak out or lodge a complaint, 
certainly against A2, and cooperative 
witnesses are hard to find. The 
inability of the authorities to provide 
the high level of protection required 
suggests that stoicism is a rational 
response in terms of everyday living.
24 Interview 015/036: The specific context here is concealed to ensure anonymity. However, given the degree of 
adversity, there are potentially significant insights to be gained from further examination of this case in terms 
of how he managed to repel what must have been inordinate pressure over a long period of time.
Perhaps the highest and most 
sustained concentration of influence is 
experienced by associates and clients 
living in A2’s estate. It is believed that 
here those individuals who by choice 
and/or circumstance have become 
associates or clients of A2’s also forfeit 
basic freedoms and privacy. 
It is thought that D2’s outwardly 
convivial interactions with members 
of An Garda Síochána may also have 
the more profound effect of convincing 
residents that the family has a special 
relationship with the Gardaí…
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Figure 3.4, which is based on the interview data, illustrates how A2’s influence is 
profiled, and suggests that physical proximity and the intensity of relationships help 
to determine the degree of influence. 
High geographical proximity/ 
low client relationship (Stoics)
Outcome: unlikely to make complaint 
or provide witness testimony
High geographical proximity/ 
high client relationship 
Outcome: criminal enterprise, close 
recruitment of network participants, 
community compliance, no complaints 
to An Garda Síochána 
Low geographical proximity/ 
low client relationship 
Outcome: avoidance
Low geographical proximity/ 
high client relationship
Outcome: criminal enterprise, selective 
recruitment of clients, no complaints to 
An Garda Síochána 
Level of 
proximity
Intensity  
of client  
relationship
Figure 3.4: A2’s influence in Greentown
Summary
The evidence presented suggests that 
the network’s influence is strongest 
in (the network leader) A2’s estate 
involving clients and associates of the 
network and (perhaps obviously) is 
weaker with increased geographical 
distance and non-aligned individuals.  
It also highlights, however (at mid-levels 
of influence), the effects of client/associate relationships and proximity, respectively, 
suggesting that the relationship trumps physical or geographical proximity. 
Finding 4: Network influences act to encourage and compel certain 
young children into abnormal patterns of criminal behaviour
In this section, levels of child offending in Greentown are compared with national 
norms. The section then presents evidence to plausibly associate the Greentown 
network in (a) attracting network membership, (b) retaining network members and 
(c) reducing the possibilities for individuals exiting the network. 
Victims of crime or antisocial 
behaviour on the estate are unlikely 
to speak out or lodge a complaint, 
certainly against A2, and cooperative 
witnesses are hard to find. 
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Comparing national youth crime trends with trends in Greentown
In examining the proposition that network influences act to encourage and 
compel certain young children into abnormal patterns of criminal behaviour, it is 
necessary first to establish whether there is any difference between the patterns 
of criminal behaviour for individuals (children and adults) in the Greentown 
network compared with national norms. Statistical data collected with reference 
to ‘all non-traffic offences’ are used here initially to establish a national baseline 
for frequency of offending, with a further focus on national ‘burglary’ statistics, 
given that elevated offending rates for burglary have already been established in 
Greentown. Table 3.2 presents data relating to the number of offences committed 
on average for (a) national non-traffic-related offending, (b) national burglary-
related offending and (c) Greentown network-related offending in 2010–2011, the 
period of the Greentown case study. 
Table 3.2: Comparisons of frequencies of PULSE incidents (2010–2011)
Offences
Non-traffic 
national  
(Over 12 years)
Non-traffic 
national  
(12–17 years)
Non-traffic 
national  
(12–19 years)
Non-traffic 
national  
(12–24 years)
1 70% 71% 67% 67%
2 13% 13% 14% 14%
3 6% 5% 6% 6%
4 3% 3% 3% 4%
5+ 9% 8% 10% 10%
Offences
Burglary  
national  
(Over 12 years)
Burglary 
national  
(12–17 years)
Burglary 
national  
(12–19 years)
Burglary 
national  
(12–24 years)
1 47% 58% 53% 48%
2 14% 16% 16% 15%
3 8% 6% 7% 8%
4 6% 5% 6% 6%
5+ 25% 15% 19% 23%
Offences
Greentown
network  
(All)
Greentown
network  
(12–17 years)
Greentown
network  
(12–19 years)
Greentown
network  
(12–24 years)
1 o% 0% 0% 0%
2 3% 0% 0% 0%
3 6% 0% 0% 4%
4 13% 13% 8% 13%
5+ 77% 75% 69% 74%
Source: An Garda Síochána Analysis Service
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The table splits age ranges 12–17 years (children), 12–19 years (19 years = approximate 
peak age of offending for all non-traffic offences) and 12–24 years (where the highest 
volume of offending occurs and rates begin to taper off). Taking the ‘All’ non-traffic 
(national) category, the table indicates that, on average, 9% of individuals have 
been detected for committing five or more offences. The rate is almost three times 
higher for national burglary figures (25%). However, in the Greentown network, 77% 
of individuals have been detected for committing five or more offences. This is three 
times the rate for national burglary figures and over eight times the rate for all non-
traffic offences nationally. 
For children (i.e. column relating to 12–17 years) the comparisons are more stark; 
nationally, 8% of non-traffic offenders were detected for five offences or more, 15% 
of burglary offenders were detected for five or more offences, but in Greentown 75% 
of 12–17 year-olds were detected for five or more offences. This indicates a rate of 
burglary at five times the national average. None of the children in the Greentown 
network had been detected for fewer than two offences over the period 2010–2011. 
Accepting all the caveats that apply when 
relying on official crime data (and the 
small numbers of children identified in this 
study), the contrasts between ‘individuals 
in the Greentown network’ and national 
averages are significant. While there are 
insufficient data to indicate prolonged 
offending behaviour beyond the normal 
age/crime curve, the data indicate a 
significantly more serious pattern of  
offending in terms of frequency.
The Greentown network: entry to, and emergence in, the network
Risk factors for associates entering the network include poor affinity and 
performance at school; family involvement in crime, drugs and alcohol misuse; 
antisocial peer groups and ineffective parenting/guardianship, all of which leave 
children vulnerable, and perhaps present as no surprise. However, given that the 
evidence so far suggests that the majority of children and families choose not to 
associate with A2 and the network, the challenge is to discriminate which factors are 
linked with children engaging with, or being selected and recruited for, the network.
In attempting to describe the context for ‘vulnerability’, the research focuses here on 
clusters of risks associated with family and parenting which, according to interview 
respondents, appear to mark out the cohort of children and young people more 
likely to engage. 
A1 and B1’s family background was considered to be chaotic, unstructured and, in 
common with other active network members, troubled and dysfunctional. Their 
father had severe alcohol problems and the family as a whole had an extremely 
confrontational relationship with An Garda Síochána.
…in Greentown 75% of 12–17 
year-olds were detected for 
five or more offences. This 
indicates a rate of burglary at 
five times the national average. 
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F2 was involved in criminal behaviour at an early age, accompanying his uncle on 
burglaries, and with whom he consumed excessive alcohol. He is described as having 
a chaotic home life, no interest in school, poor parental controls permitting him to 
stay out unsupervised all night, and has been the subject of care proceedings. Less is 
known about ‘the little fella’, however; the available data suggest that he experiences 
the same generally chaotic environment, lacks the guidance of a ‘father figure’, and 
is a drug user. This composite picture of a chaotic, hedonistic and boundary-less 
ecosystem of childhood experiences is, on the face of it, in significant contrast with 
Z1, A2, B2 and D2 (the latter three of whom are members of the same family). 
Z1 is included in this group because (from the little we know of him) he presents 
with more similarities to A2’s family than the previous profile of associates. Z1 is 
from outside Greentown, a member of another criminalised family who joined the 
Greentown network as an adult and therefore, strictly speaking, is not of priority 
interest. However, the observation that despite background criminality his family is 
described as reasonably functional (similar to A2 and in contrast with D1 and other 
associates) means that his situation merits mention. 
It is argued here that A2’s family involvement in the network can be described as 
dynastical, given that he is the current leader in a multigenerational criminal family 
network. B2, a close family member, is seen as successor. Consequently, language 
relating to the network for A2’s family speaks more appropriately of ‘emergence’ as 
opposed to ‘engagement’.  
The contrasts between A2’s family and the circumstances endured by associate 
families are clear. One respondent observed:
A2 has a mother and father at home … His brothers are all closely knit 
family … Now they never did schooling and their learning. They’ve been 
taught by mother and father how to rob … okay and how to get away with 
it and you know … But of all the families, they are probably the most 
functional of the whole lot of them … the same with Z1, his family in the 
… Well, he’s from out of town … are a total intact family, mother or father, 
brothers, sisters or whatever.
B2 and D2 are coached by parents 
and kinship elders. This cultivation, 
nurturing and shaping analogy is 
in marked contrast to associate 
membership of the network, where 
neglect and vulnerability help to 
discriminate who engages and 
who does not engage. Appendix 7 
illustrates (based on interviewees’ testimonials) the limited exposure of A2’s family to 
a range of antisocial influences, compared with the significant exposure of associates 
to these influences. 
Consequently, language relating to 
the network for A2’s family speaks 
more appropriately of ‘emergence’ as 
opposed to ‘engagement’.  
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Given that the vast majority of 
children and families do not engage, 
it appears that some form of prior 
vulnerability filters those more 
likely to do so, and there is evidence 
that such vulnerability is actively 
targeted. 
The evidence suggests that vulnerability is a key context for associate engagement 
in the network. This contrasts with a succession, coaching and grooming narrative 
which is attached to B2 and D2’s emergence, where continuity is provided by A2, his 
family and most trusted associates. 
The Greentown network – retention
Using the data collected and the available literature, this section attempts to offer 
some explanations for why individuals, once engaged, tend to stay engaged and, 
during the period of engagement, commit offences in multiples of the national 
norm.
There are clear, powerful relational influences which act in combination and are 
sustained over time. Some of these influences relate to what have been regarded in 
the literature as pull factors. Grounded in the Greentown experience, these manifest 
as reverence towards A2 and his family by certain young people, acquisition of 
social capital by being associated with A2 or other powerful network members, and 
coveting A2’s trappings and lifestyle.
The evidence also reveals significant push factors that compel individuals in the 
network into repeat action. These push factors can be overt, but they tend to be more 
subliminal. (It is thought that D1 may be beaten up if he does not submit to A2’s 
directions.) Much of the fear relating to A2, his family and the potential wrath of the 
network against individuals relates to perceptions, stories and myths (accepting that 
there is truth in the rumours). This hidden hand drives network actors to seek protection 
in the network, and regulates compliance in terms of debt payment and silence. 
A key pattern emerged involving 
complex couplings of normally 
mutually repelling qualities, 
for example; friendship and 
fear, intimacy and disposability, 
and protection and exposure. 
This ambiguity is captured in 
the following comment from a 
respondent:
The evidence suggests that 
vulnerability is a key context for 
associate engagement in the network.
  Much of the fear relating to A2, 
his family and the potential wrath 
of the network against individuals 
relates to perceptions, stories and 
myths. This hidden hand drives 
network actors to seek protection 
in the network, and regulates 
compliance in terms of debt 
payment and silence. 
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They’re looking up to them and to be honest a lot of kids would be afraid 
of D2; there are even some lads you’d think are his friends and you’d know 
even by talking to them that they’re afraid of him. Well, maybe not afraid 
of him … they’re afraid of the background, so they get involved I suppose 
stupidly and they make friends, and then he comes knocking at the door 
saying “come on, we’re going somewhere” and then they go … because the 
consequences of not going could be worse.
While fear compels certain children into action, there is some suggestion that 
they are also attracted by the fear that they generate to subordinate others in 
Greentown, as a consequence of the social capital gained from alignment with key 
network players. However, involvement entangles individuals who engage, making 
extrication very difficult, especially if there is no protective influence in the child’s 
home to draw them back.
The Greentown network – getting out
Although it appears from PULSE data that there is an eventual decline of criminal 
activity in the Greentown network in line with national norms, data are limited in 
relation to gauging desistance from criminal activity. However, supplementary 
PULSE data25 made available for the study indicate that 17 of the 31 individuals in the 
Greentown network had been detected for an offence in 2013 and a further 10 were 
detected in 2012, indicating that whatever personal relationships individuals still 
had with the network, there had been continuing offence-related activity. 
The concept of knifing off is useful 
here. It describes the process 
whereby an individual may leave 
the network. ‘Knifing off’ can be 
both physical (i.e. moving location) 
and cognitive (reconciling the 
discrepancy between the old and the 
new self) and both severances may be 
necessary to start a new redemptive 
narrative (Maruna, 2011).
However, while the former can be initiated by a third party, the latter can only be 
achieved by the individual himself or herself. A good example of this is the case of 
‘the little fella’, who was removed physically from Greentown for a period but who, 
within days of his return, was reunited with F2, A1 and D1. The clearest example 
in terms of ‘knifing off’ is the case of H1.26 However, the key features of H1’s case, 
identified by the respondent, are worth reflecting on.
25 It is not possible to reproduce this chart for reasons related to protecting anonymity. The chart is held 
securely by the Analysis Service of An Garda Síochána.
26 Other cases were highlighted, but H1 was the only case where there was no dispute about whether he had 
turned his life around. Other examples had either conflicting accounts or were described in imprecise terms: 
for example, ‘slowed down’, ‘not in as much trouble’.
While fear compels certain 
children into action, there is some 
suggestion that they are also 
attracted by the fear that they 
generate to subordinate others…
Chapter 3: Research findings 49
H1 never really got involved with any of the major players in Greentown, 
and he was kind of doing his own thing … And I’d say that’s how he found 
it easy to get out of it, he’s totally no longer in our system … H1 never 
actually got into the middle of it … He never got into the middle structure 
of … this whole system in … He actually never got smack bang into the 
middle of it, he was only on the periphery … And then he decided to step 
back and A2 and his likes never really had that much trust or whatever in 
H1 … So they weren’t asking him to do anything … So he just stepped back 
from it all … and he was just lucky. 
The respondent observes that H1 is an ‘exception’, contrasting his anomalous 
fortune with more routine circumstances of clients and associates, driven to deeper 
and deeper obligations with key network members. 
B1 is thought to have distanced himself more from the network, although there 
was divergence among respondents in terms of ‘degree’. Consistent with some 
commentary on gang exit strategies, his separation by external factors – a new 
family prompting a new realisation – permitted him to propose legitimate excuses 
(Pyrooz and Decker, 2011, p. 422), making him less likely to attract any retribution. 
More generally, due to the small size 
of Greentown, it is difficult to avoid 
contact with network members and 
to get out of their line of sight once 
engaged or obligated. Geographical 
and/or cognitive ‘knifing off’ is 
difficult to achieve, certainly for core 
members of the network, as long as A2 
retains his position. D1, for example, 
was physically punished for not 
keeping up with A2’s demands. It is 
generally suggested that D1 had sufficient capacity to exercise agency but that he had 
chosen to participate in the network; he made his own decisions and ‘he didn’t want to 
walk away’.
Difficult as it may be, it was suggested that if an individual was able to withstand 
multiple enticements and/or requirements by A2 and/or other key network actors, 
‘knifing off’ is possible if the will is there. However, it is considered that any ‘knifing 
off’ intent while ‘in situ’ is poorly supported by the State, with very few options and 
very little assistance to act or plan to act pro-socially. It is believed that both D1’s 
and ‘the little fella’s’ identification and protective welfare intervention came far too 
late to make any impact, and that for D1, in particular, the provision of a substitute 
responsible family at a young age would have offered the best chance of change. 
The respondent observes that H1 
is an ‘exception’, contrasting his 
anomalous fortune with more routine 
circumstances of clients and associates, 
driven to deeper and deeper obligations 
with key network members. 
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There were suspicions that core 
network members (adults and 
children) deliberately manipulated 
the justice system. This included 
managing detections,  and ‘ratcheting’ 
strategies in the juvenile diversion 
process, suggesting that on occasion 
some children would admit to 
offences they have not committed 
in order to avoid another child with 
more cautions from elevating their seriousness and bringing the system closer to 
a decision to prosecute.27 Other evidence suggesting that key network members 
contrived to delay legal proceedings, combined with what are perceived to be light 
sentences, incommensurate with the crime(s) committed are seen to contribute to 
a sense for those Greentown network associates or clients that little will change in 
terms of the natural order. 
The perceived scale of challenges for 
associates in terms of ‘knifing off’, 
similar to treatments of engagement 
and retention, presents as qualitatively 
different for A2 and family members. 
Some testimony suggested that 
neither B2 nor D2 would be interested 
in any other life, and that the gains 
accrued from being a member of A2’s 
family presented a self-interested 
rational reason for continuance. 
However, this sense of conscious choice is countered by the institutional reality of 
‘a life mapped out’ for B2 and D2, restricting options and setting the parameters for 
behaviour, requiring them not just to run but also to hide if (however unlikely) they 
choose to leave or desist from criminal behaviour. 
Summary
This final section has attempted to apply what has emerged from the examination 
of the first three findings to assessing whether, on balance, there is evidence of a 
network effect in encouraging and compelling children into abnormal offending 
patterns.
The most potent network factors with regard to associates relate to selection and 
recruitment (engagement); strong pull and push dynamics; a culture of compliance; 
the offer of a deal (retention); and restriction of choice and creation of uncertainties 
27 Interview 005/014, and Interview 006/012: These references relate to suspicions that adults and children 
manage ‘ratcheting’ in the juvenile Diversion process, suggesting that on occasion some children will admit 
to offences they have not committed in order to avoid another child with more cautions from elevating their 
seriousness and bringing the system closer to a decision to prosecute.
…due to the small size of 
Greentown, it is difficult to avoid 
contact with network members and 
to get out of their line of sight once 
engaged or obligated. 
However, it is considered that any 
‘knifing off’ intent while ‘in situ’ 
is poorly supported by the State, 
with very few options and very 
little assistance to act or plan to 
act pro-socially.
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such that individuals contemplating leaving the network would be discouraged 
(getting out). The network factors with regard to family members relate to history, 
expectation, family brand, legitimacy to control, emergence, succession; effectively  
a preordained role. 
There is evidence to suggest that these factors are omnipresent in the lives of the 
children reported by respondents, particularly in A2’s locale and where his influence 
extends beyond the immediate estate into families where there is an established 
client relationship. However, attributing an abnormal crime trajectory to the 
effect of a network is problematic. There are no control groups to gauge whether 
the same (negative) effect of longer and more serious crime trajectories could be 
achieved with no network. Nor is there the possibility of a randomly assigned group 
within Greentown to test the potency of the network effect against ‘life as normal’. 
This study seeks instead to propose that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
plausible argument for a network contributory effect association with abnormal 
crime trajectories for the children involved.
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The purpose of this study was to explore whether criminal networks played a role in 
causing children to develop longer and more serious crime trajectories. The focus of 
the study was the Greentown network. 
This chapter considers the relevance of the study to the current body of knowledge. 
The implications of the study findings for policy in the area of youth crime are also 
discussed, along with the potential for further practical application. 
Study findings and the existing literature
This study responds to the demand in the mainstream risk science literature for 
more enquiries into the situational context of persistent youth offending (Loeber 
and Farrington, 2012, p. 101) and a number of its findings resonate with the existing 
literature. 
Finding 1 suggests that the Greentown network was hierarchical in nature, 
indicating centralised authority, rather than a more even distribution of power and 
influence. Similar to Fader (2016), the study finds further that, within the network, 
membership of the network leader A2’s family and kinship group appears to 
confer elevated privilege based on trust as opposed to contract, obligation and 
threat. Pilbeam et al (2012, p. 368) have identified the role of trust as a distinctive 
governance mechanism for core members at the centre in their more mainstream 
treatments of networks as institutions. Evidence presented in the study relating to 
the clamour for status by associates supports other studies of criminal networks and 
their pull potential to permit individuals who are engaged to acquire social capital 
(O’Brien et al, 2013, p. 422; Pitts, 2008, p. 84). Concerns about ‘associate’ opportunism 
in the Greentown network are mitigated by push forces associated with debt or 
obligation and underpinned by a perception of ubiquitous surveillance by A2. 
Finding 2 identifies powerful structures, processes and a compliant culture 
enveloping network members and serving to sustain the network. This includes 
evidence of how the expectations of key network actors direct and influence 
behaviour: for example, norms of behaviour in relation to exchanges with An Garda 
Síochána. Other studies have identified this ability of networks (more generally) 
to set expectations (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2) and determine behaviour or delineate 
opportunities for discretion (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008, p. 599). Pitts (2008, 
p. 37) has identified how distinctive 
beliefs and attitudes are cultivated in 
gangs and networks. While directed 
at community, Horney et al’s analogy 
of ‘preying’ (Loeber and Farrington, 
2012, p. 109) and notions of poor 
guardianship (Braga and Weisburd, 
2012, p. 351) are relevant here in 
terms of family vulnerabilities and 
inadequate parental protection as 
experienced by F2 and ‘the little fella’.
Finding 1 suggests that the 
Greentown network was 
hierarchical in nature, indicating 
centralised authority, rather than 
a more even distribution of power 
and influence. 
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Finding 3 suggests that the degree 
of A2’s power and influence is 
determined by factors such as 
proximity and client obligation. The 
study suggests that the network’s 
influence is strongest in A2’s estate 
involving clients and associates, 
where individuals such as D1, E1 
and A1 are truly ‘embedded’ (Pyrooz 
et al, 2013, p. 241) and involved in a tight, ‘redundant’ (McGloin and Piquero, 
2010) collection of antisocial relationships. However, the testimonies of Garda 
respondents in the Greentown study suggest that, within what should be the highest 
risk location (close to A2’s home), stoical families go about their day-to-day business 
and do not become involved. Conversely, the study indicates strong network 
influence for certain individuals (adults and children) who live outside A2’s estate 
and who have an obligation-bound client relationship relating, for example, to debts 
incurred from borrowing money from A2 or co-enterprise in past offending events.
Finding 4 suggests that network 
factors  plausibly converge to 
produce an overall network effect 
for certain children. The study finds 
that there is insufficient evidence 
to indicate whether the Greentown 
network caused longer crime 
trajectories for children. However, 
the finding that participation in the network is associated with elevated frequency of 
serious offending, as demonstrated in Table 3.2, resonates with findings by scholars 
operating in this area. Rosenfeld et al, for example, point to ‘an enhancement 
effect’ associated with gang membership, ‘… a combination of selection and social 
facilitation’ (qtd in Loeber and Farrington, 2012, p. 124). Importantly, the study 
helps to highlight one of the key shortcomings in the risk science literature, which 
is that, in its treatment of youth crime as a logical exercise balancing risk factors 
with sufficient protection factors, it generally fails to consider that contexts are not 
passive and can, in fact, be very potent. 
Practical applications
The network tool and its associated 
procedures offer possible wider 
utility for academic/law enforcement 
collaboration in the study of criminal 
networks. 
Finding 2 identifies powerful 
structures, processes and a 
compliant culture enveloping 
network members and serving to 
sustain the network. 
Finding 3 suggests that the degree 
of A2’s power and influence is 
determined by factors such as 
proximity and client obligation. 
Finding 4 suggests that network 
factors  plausibly converge to 
produce an overall network effect 
for certain children. 
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The application of the network tool to the phenomenon of criminal network 
provides an evidence-based means to examine the anatomy of its nodes and links, 
and to get a better practical sense of the natural size and state of the problem and 
the effort required in order to reduce a network’s effect. In terms of law enforcement, 
the approach may highlight opportunities to identify points of vulnerability and 
employ saboteur tactics to reduce a network’s influence. 
For academics, Twinsight offers a robust protocol for engaging authorities to 
undertake sensitive areas of study. The Twinsight technique provides a novel 
‘non-invasive’ means for examining sensitive issues and material in an in-depth 
but ethically compliant manner to produce authentic, detailed narratives about 
relationships and transactions between individuals and groups of individuals in 
networks. This in turn could help with new theory development via empirical study. 
However, in order to protect its integrity as a potentially powerful data collection 
method for research into sensitive 
areas, and collaborations between 
academics and law enforcement 
personnel, the clear rules devised for 
this study, in particular relating to 
the strict separation of anonymised 
and live data and the protection of 
respondents’ identities, must be 
observed in any future usage of 
Twinsight. 
Policy implications
The key outcome of this study has been to highlight an area of risk for children 
which has, to date, been given relatively little attention, certainly in the Irish 
literature. The evidence that the Greentown criminal network (2010–2011) 
functioned as a factor additional to the usual inventory of risks associated with 
youthful offending presents significantly contrary indications when considered 
against a largely sanguine approach to youth crime.
Even though the children involved in the Greentown network represent a small 
minority, their activities, from a law enforcement perspective, pose a considerable 
problem. This small population of children in Greentown was, during 2010–2011, 
responsible for a significant level 
of serious crime, five times higher 
than equivalent national averages 
for burglary. This suggests that it is 
legitimate to allocate disproportionate 
resources in this area. Additionally, 
given the clear association between 
burglary and repeat offending more 
generally, a referral of a child to the 
Diversion Programme for burglary 
The Twinsight technique provides 
a novel ‘non-invasive’ means 
for examining sensitive issues 
and material in an in-depth but 
ethically compliant manner…
This small population of children 
in Greentown was, during 2010–
2011, responsible for a significant 
level of serious crime, five times 
higher than equivalent national 
averages for burglary.
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or a related offence should, perhaps, presume enhanced concern. Nevertheless, this 
research suggests that burglary predicts possible adult influence and that any such 
concern should be welfare related and protective as opposed to justice related and 
punitive.  
The Diversion Programme and court systems appear to have been routinely gamed 
by certain actors in Greentown. A2’s organic governance mechanisms in place in 
the Greentown network are seemingly far more influential than any formal agency 
or court sanction in directing behaviour and retaining control of associates. The 
suggestion that adults in the network appear to actively recruit and cultivate 
certain children towards criminal activity, coupled with the absence of nurturing 
and protection, challenges authorities to consider whether statutory remedial 
protections are required in such cases. 
The weight of evidence in the study indicates that the criminal justice system, in the 
context of the Greentown network, is founded on questionable notions of rational 
and responsible action by both offenders and victims. The study has suggested that 
institutional assumptions regarding individuals volunteering complaints to An Garda 
Síochána or providing witness testimony against network actors are greatly misplaced 
for clients of the Greentown network and those living in close proximity to A2. 
The state of equilibrium suggested 
by the study, and sustained by A2’s 
family presence in Greentown, infers 
that short-term law enforcement 
(or other) campaigns will do little 
to disrupt the network’s essential 
balance. Shortening the individual 
careers of youth offenders is of little 
value if the network acts to generate 
a constant throughput of young 
people. Such situations can only 
be effectively addressed through 
sustained long-term planning and 
intervention. A long-term view may 
also permit reimagining of the relationship between the State and an individual in 
terms of rewarding and protecting those who are cognitively prepared to ‘knife off’ 
from their offending past. 
These findings will be of value in terms of wider deliberation relating to children 
involved in criminal networks and/or more general treatments of high-crime 
neighbourhoods in Ireland. Future research in this area would obviously benefit 
from multiple viewpoints, including those of children, network participants and, 
in the experience of Greentown, better insights into the coping strategies of those 
families identified as stoics.
The suggestion that adults in the 
network appear to actively recruit 
and cultivate certain children 
towards criminal activity, coupled 
with the absence of nurturing and 
protection, challenges authorities 
to consider whether statutory 
remedial protections are required 
in such cases.
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However, the ethical and logistical challenges associated with such engagements 
should not be underestimated. It is suggested that the study be repeated in further 
sites, including Dublin, to test the validity of the Greentown findings. In parallel, an 
action research project may be a useful and prudent means to process the findings 
of Greentown in the context of designing and trialling new forms of response and 
intervention.
Shortening the individual 
careers of youth offenders is of 
little value if the network acts to 
generate a constant throughput 
of young people.
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Appendix 1: Data collection strategy for semi-structured 
interviews
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Appendix 2: Network 1 frame of analysis – zoom-in view
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Appendix 3: Navigating the Greentown network
A1
 – 18 years
C1
 – 21 years
H1
 – 16 years
M
1 – 16 years
J1
 – 27 years
E1
 – 19 years
F1
 – 21 years
D1
 – 20 years
B1
 – 21 yearsNode is an individual 
member of the 
Greentown network.
Link represents an 
offence incident recorded 
by PULSE.
Unique identifier 
permits  tracking of 
issues and themes with 
individuals or groups  
of individuals.
Navigating the Greentown network
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Appendix 4: Interview extract
Garda: I suppose just because ever since I came down he was the name that was 
always said to me and one of the first houses that was pointed out to me when 
I went out in the car. You know, keep an eye on him, intelligence reasons. He 
was always a prominent figure down in Greentown as long as I’ve been here and 
that hasn’t changed, you know. You often hear of a fella being prominent and 
then falling from grace; you know, as in no one’s listening to him anymore, but 
that has never happened with him.
SR: And what’s kept it going then, what’s sustained it? ’Cos you’re right. These 
networks are sometimes quite fragile. So what’s kept that going?
Garda: I suppose people are so afraid of him. He just has that reputation. 
Maybe in their world … Maybe he hasn’t been caught by us doing anything in 
particular. Well, obviously he has on a few occasions, but like he’s probably 
just intimidating in that he’s a strong character, like. No one would mess with 
him and he gets that message across in different ways. And they know if they 
mess with him there’s going to be some kind of consequence. And he’s kept 
that going. Like, he hasn’t let anyone go with things maybe. So that’s how he’s 
keeping his name going and keeping those around him in line as such.
(Interview 009, p. 19)
Note: SR denotes the author and researcher. 
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Appendix 5: Interview extract
Garda: So, he might cut the drugs up into a number of different ( just for 
example, no, cos there’s probably more than three) but into three groups – A1, 
D1 and E1 would get some of those drugs each. Then they would distribute that 
each themselves to local, really small-time drug dealers, and then those drug 
dealers would give to the users.
SR: So, that’s like the retail end. They’re the ones who are doing the selling?
Garda: So like, I’m just saying that’s in relation to drugs … but, so the top family 
A2 (he might not be on his own, like … but his family) might get drugs. They 
might dish them out in large quantities to D1, E1 and A1 and then they will in 
turn break them up into smaller groups and give them to the likes of U1 who 
need them. And U1 is paying these guys massive money that he can’t really 
afford to get back and U1 is dishing them out all over the place … in really small 
25 (euro) bags … That’s only hypothetical with drugs, but it’s the same with 
organising burglaries and everything. It’s the same structure.
SR: And the – so that’s the individuals and then the links – how those links are 
characterised are… 
Garda: Yes, it’s definitely… there’s money involved. They’re like … they’re linked 
to it. A2 would be after investing into something and organising something. 
And then A1, D1 and E1 would also be investing but would still owe A2 … Now it 
might not be money. It might be something else. He might owe him – well, let’s 
just stick with money say … but then like the relationship then, ok that’s all well 
and good until it goes bad. Now, it hasn’t gone bad yet, so then it’s a friendship. 
(Interview 010, p. 14)
Note: SR denotes the author and researcher. 
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Appendix 6: Coding and analysis framework  
One requisite process for setting up a database to manage unstructured data is to 
identify and create the unit of analysis and observation, referred to in NVivo as 
a node (Bazeley and Richards, 2000, pp. 23–24). In this study the unit of analysis 
was not, as would typically be the case, the interviewee, but the individuals on the 
network map to whom Gardaí referred during the interviews. A ‘case file’ was created 
for each individual in the network, and qualitative data from the interviews were 
then added to the relevant individual’s case file. 
Coding framework: the process from open coding to development of themes  
and propositions
A nine-phase framework, derived from the work of Maykut and Morehouse (1994)  
on qualitative data analysis, was used for coding and analysis.
Open coding (phase 1) involved line-by-line examination of interview transcripts 
to break them down into viable and transferable units of meaning which could later 
assist in the construction of higher-level categorisations and propositions. This 
exercise yielded a total of more than 300 codes.
Categorisation (phase 2) involved the reorganisation of these codes, referencing 
the research question as an additional arbiter for inclusion. NVivo allows for the 
organisation of data into a tree structure, which permitted the researcher to observe 
the development of patterns where clusters of data began to congregate. This 
process of initial reduction produced 61 categories.
Propositions
Themes
Categories
Codes
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Coding on (phase 3) involved the exploration of relationships and patterns across 
categories, and further reconfiguration of codes in order to achieve a deeper 
understanding of embedded meanings. 
In-case and cross-case analyses (phases 4 and 5) involved examination of the 
emergent themes as they related intrinsically to individual cases and compared 
across cases. 
Data reduction (phase 6) involved consolidation of the codes into themes, which 
were further informed by the research literature in the area. This process reduced 
the overall number of categories and was developed iteratively alongside phases 7 
and 8 below.
Writing analytical memos, which involved committing thoughts and ideas to 
paper, was carried out from the outset of the coding and analysis process. At this 
point (phase 7), however, it was focused on trying to arrive at propositions and 
identify patterns directly relevant to the research enquiry. ‘Hierarchy’, for example, 
surfaced here as an early, important theme, which was retained in the final analysis. 
Validating analytical memos (phase 8) involved testing the developing 
propositions against the evidence. NVivo’s capacity to support analysis here was of 
particular benefit, seeking evidence deep in the data and scattered across various 
categories and cases to support, modify or refute developing explanations and 
propositions.
Proposition development (phase 9) yielded three propositions, each of which 
derived from evidence ‘drawn from across the full range of available texts’ (Bazeley, 
2009, p. 19). A further proposition, responding directly to the research enquiry, was 
then abstracted from the three subordinate propositions: ‘Network influences act 
to encourage and compel certain children in Greentown into abnormal patterns of 
criminal behaviour.’
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Appendix 7: Analysis of ‘antisocial influences’ on A2 
family members compared with associates
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